Abstract: Philosophers agree that coercion and deception can undermine sexual consent. They disagree about the types of deception that can undermine consent, and the degree of harm associated with a threat that is required to undermine consent. In this paper, I examine some inconsistencies in the explanatory stories provided by authors on these points. I suggest a new account of the relationship between deception and consent, and a new account of the relationship between coercion and consent. These accounts are consistent with each other - and explained by my analysis of rights-waiving. Most controversially, I suggest that some forms of sexual coercion might constitute rape, or a moral wrong as significant as the wrong of rape, without actually undermining consent.
Hallie Liberto is an assistant professor at the University of Connecticut
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