"Realism about what there is, but idealism about what is the case"
Abstract: Idealism is the grand philosophical vision that minds are metaphysically central to reality. Strong idealism goes further and holds that not just any minds, but our human minds are metaphysically central to reality. How we might be so central is unclear, and it is unclear whether there is a coherent version of idealism which is compatible with what we generally know to be the case, for example that there was a world long before we were around. In this talk I want to formulate and defend a version of idealism which holds that we are metaphysically central to reality understood as all that is the case, but not to reality understood as all there is. I will spell out a sense of dependence and present an argument that the totality fo things is independent of us, while the totality of facts depends on us, and furthermore how such a mixed view is coherent.
