"Transcendental Realism and Kant’s “Argument from Spinozism"
Abstract: In the Critique of Practical Reason, as well as in a number of later texts, Kant argues that transcendental realism (the philosophical view opposed to his own view, which he dubs “transcendental idealism”) leads to “Spinozism.” Kant also claims, relatedly, that if transcendental idealism were false, then Spinozism would be true. This is, to put it mildly, a provocative thing for him to say, given that during his day Spinoza was the ultimate philosophical boogeyman. It is also rather baffling, as one might naturally expect Kant to say instead that if transcendental idealism weren’t true then some more benign version of transcendental realism would be the consequence, like the comforting position of Leibniz, to whose position Kant is often said to be close. Scholars have finally begun the effort of reconstructing and evaluating the reasoning behind Kant’s so-called “Argument from Spinozism.” So far, the results have been disappointing. To the extent that there is much of a common denominator in the analyses on offer it is that the argument ends up being a dud. (This includes my own earlier, deeply flawed analysis.) Indeed, Michela Massimi has recently concluded that the argument is nothing more than a “red herring” and a “gimmick.” My goal is to provide a philosophically, textually, and contextually satisfying interpretation of the Argument from Spinozism. As I try to show, it turns out be not a gimmick or a dud but instead a sophisticated, serious bit of reasoning, one which is connected to, and serves to illuminate, a number of interesting (but otherwise overlooked) aspects of Kant’s philosophy.
James Messina is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
