"The Normative Function of Intentional Action"
Abstrct: In this talk, I will identify a normative function of the concept of intentional action. Specifically, I will argue for the Prioritizing Thesis: the concept of intentional action functions to focus our evaluative concern on the things done that are most requiring of our normative evaluation. It acts as a proxy for evaluative priority. I'll offer two arguments for the Prioritizing Thesis. The first will show that given the kinds of creatures we are, we need a concept that functions to prioritize evaluative concern, and the concept of intentional action uniquely exhibits the features we’d expect from a concept with this prioritizing function. The second argument illustrates the explanatory power of the Prioritizing Thesis. The thesis explains in a unified manner several puzzling features of intentional action, including the Knobe effect, disagreement over whether knowledge is required for intentional action, and cultural variation in the ascription of intentionality. I'll conclude the talk by gesturing at the broader project within which the Prioritizing Thesis is embedded: a “function-first” action theory on which we investigate our ideas of agency with a focus on their functions---especially their normative functions---in a human life.
Mikayla Kelley is an Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago.