Ohio State nav bar

Department Colloquium: Antonia Peacocke

AP
October 7, 2022
3:30PM - 5:30PM
353 University Hall

Date Range
Add to Calendar 2022-10-07 15:30:00 2022-10-07 17:30:00 Department Colloquium: Antonia Peacocke "Imagination and Underdetermination" Philosophers often distinguish two things in episodes of imagination: (i) the mental image, which comprises various looks, tastes, sounds, and so on; and (ii) total imaginative content, which also specifies background, context, or more properties that are not strictly incorporated into the image. It is then said that the mental image involved in an episode of imagination underdetermines its total imaginative content: for example, the same (type of) mental image might be involved in imagining a real live dog, or a hyperrealistic animatronic dog. What else can do the work of determining that total imaginative content? Previous answers to this question (from Chris Peacocke, Amy Kind, and Peter Kung) have used metaphors that don’t sufficiently explain the relationship between a mental image and total imaginative content. In this talk, I’ll advance a new answer to this question that applies to at least some cases of imagination. The answer uses the structure of intentional mental action to help us understand total imaginative content. You can intentionally call a certain image to mind as a way of imagining an F. Your acting on a complex intention to do all that at once makes it the case that when the mental image comes to mind, it is already invested with the cognitive significance of an image of an F—even if the image could, in other mental projects, be used to imagine something other than an F. It is your role as an agent that fills out total imaginative content. Antonia Peacocke is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. 353 University Hall Department of Philosophy philosophy@osu.edu America/New_York public

"Imagination and Underdetermination"

Philosophers often distinguish two things in episodes of imagination: (i) the mental image, which comprises various looks, tastes, sounds, and so on; and (ii) total imaginative content, which also specifies background, context, or more properties that are not strictly incorporated into the image. It is then said that the mental image involved in an episode of imagination underdetermines its total imaginative content: for example, the same (type of) mental image might be involved in imagining a real live dog, or a hyperrealistic animatronic dog. What else can do the work of determining that total imaginative content? Previous answers to this question (from Chris Peacocke, Amy Kind, and Peter Kung) have used metaphors that don’t sufficiently explain the relationship between a mental image and total imaginative content. In this talk, I’ll advance a new answer to this question that applies to at least some cases of imagination. The answer uses the structure of intentional mental action to help us understand total imaginative content. You can intentionally call a certain image to mind as a way of imagining an F. Your acting on a complex intention to do all that at once makes it the case that when the mental image comes to mind, it is already invested with the cognitive significance of an image of an F—even if the image could, in other mental projects, be used to imagine something other than an F. It is your role as an agent that fills out total imaginative content.

Antonia Peacocke is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University.