Jordan Brown
MA in Medical Humanities and Bioethics, Northwestern University, 2020
MS in Genetic Counseling, Northwestern University, 2017
BA in History, George Mason University, 2015
Sze Hoi (Steve) Chan
BA in Philosophy, University of Hong Kong
MA in Philosophy, University of Houston
My main areas of interests are moral psychology and ethics. Recently, I think a lot about ethical phenomena that involve interesting (or puzzling) psychological mechanisms. Here are two examples.
- When an object of public value (e.g., democracy) deteriorates, political resistance may aim to preserve the object of value. However, certain political resistance is criticized for “making things worse” — not only does the resistance not help preserve the object of value, but the resistance even seems destructive to the marginal remains of the object of value that still remain. I want to make the claim that sometimes it can be apt to destroy, instead of preserving, marginal remains of what we value in order to prevent the perversion of our value.
- It is not uncommon for one to find another agent’s quality of will to be indeterminate. Consider a helicopter parent that is overly controlling, which harmed you when you were a kid. The parent’s motive may be largely unconscious (it is hard for anyone, not even the parent themselves, to tell whether the action was out of love or a desire to control). The motive/intention may be rediscovered in a therapy session (the parent thought it was love at the time of action, but learnt that they were just a control freak; and the rediscovery can go on and on). And there may be no explicit intention of the parent’s behaviour when the behaviour is habitual or instinctive (your parent may be largely mirroring what your grandparents did to them). Perhaps there are interesting ethical lessons to be learnt from such seeming indeterminacy.
Robert Laurent
BA in Philosophy and English, Missouri - St. Louis
MA in Philosophy, Missouri - St. Louis
Areas of interest: Philosophy of Language, Mind, History of Philosophy
I am interested in concepts, both as they occur in mental representations and as intersubjective social categories that evolve over time. I would like to be able to reconcile these two concepts of concepts and to explore the extent to which our knowledge depends upon them.
Liz Rozenberg
B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy, Toronto Metropolitan University, 2022
M.A. in Philosophy, Toronto Metropolitan University, 2024
Area of Interest: Philosophy of Mind, Ethics
My primary research interests concern the nature and significance of various mental states. I am especially interested in affective mental states, including questions about their phenomenology as well as their potential role in rationalizing action and belief.
Eli Schantz
B.A. in Philosophy & B.A. in Biology, Indiana University Bloomington
M.D. in progress, Indiana University School of Medicine
Areas of interest: Philosophy of medicine, metaphysics, applied ethics
As an MD/PhD student, my interests naturally lie in the philosophy of medicine. I am particularly interested in medical concepts, such as those of disease and harm, and how our understanding of these concepts impacts clinical practice; I am also interested in how these metaphysical considerations can shed light on ethical controversies in medicine. Outside of philosophy, I am heavily involved in healthcare advocacy, and am always willing to share a cup of tea over a game of chess.
Mingyan Yang
B.A. in Philosophy, Nanjing University, 2021
M.A. in Philosophy, Western University, 2023
M.A. in Philosophy, Fudan University, 2024
Area of interest: Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Epistemology
My current research focuses on the relation between perception and cognition. I am particularly interested in cognitive penetration, the hypothesis that cognition can influence perception in certain way. My work seeks to investigate its potential mechanism and philosophical implications. I’m also drawn to topics such as perceptual learning and attentional effects in philosophy of cognitive science.