Stewart Shapiro

Stewart Shapiro

Stewart Shapiro

O'Donnell Professor

shapiro.4@osu.edu

614-292-7914

350 E University Hall
230 N Oval Mall
Columbus, OH
43210

Google Map

Areas of Expertise

  • Philosophical Logic
  • Vagueness
  • Philosophy of Mathematics
  • Philosophy of Language

Education

  • B.A. Case Western Reserve University (Mathematics and Philosophy), 1973; Magna cum laude
  • Ph.D. SUNY at Buffalo, 1978; with distinction
  • M.A. SUNY at Buffalo (Mathematics), 1975

How to pronounce my name: 

 

Prof. Shapiro's PhilPapers page

Stewart Shapiro's complete publication list


Selected Publications:
 

  • Vagueness in context, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; reissued in paperback, March, 2008.
  • Thinking about mathematics:  The philosophy of mathematics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
  • Philosophy of mathematics:  Structure and ontology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997; reissued in paperback, Autumn 2000.
  • Foundations without foundationalism:  A case for second-order logic, Oxford Logic Guides 17, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, reissued in paperback, Summer 2000.
  • “Towards a point-free account of the continuous” (with Geoffrey Hellman), Iyyun 61, 2012, 263-287. 
  • “Revising logic in light of paradox”, in Insolubles and consequences:  essays in honor of Stephen Read, Tributes 18, edited by Catarina Dutilh and Ole Hjortland, College Publications, 2012, 213-237.
  • “An ‘i’ for an i:  singular terms, uniqueness, and reference, Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2012), 380-415.
  • “Higher-order logic and set theory:  a false dilemma”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 20 (2012), 305-323.
  • “Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall”, in Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Annalisa Coliva, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 211-237.
  • “The company kept by cut abstraction (and its relatives)”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 19, (2011), 107-138.
  • “Mathematics and objectivity”, in Meaning in mathematics, edited by John Polkinghorne, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 97-108.
  • “Theology and the actual infinite:  Burley and Cantor”, Theology and Science 9 (2011), 101-108.
  • “Foundations:  structures, sets, and categories”, in Foundational theories of classical and constructive mathematics”, Western Ontario Series in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Giovanni Soimmaruga, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, 97-110.
  •  “Varieties of pluralism and relativism for logic”, in A companion to relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 526-555.
  • “Epistemology of mathematics:  What are the questions?  What count as answers?”, Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011), 130-150
  • “So truth is safe from paradox:  now what?”, Philosophical Studies 147 (2010), 445-455.
  • “The good, the bad, and the ugly” (with Philip Ebert), Synthese 170 (2009), 415-441.
  • “We hold these truths to be self evident: But what do we mean by that?”, Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2009), 175-207.
  • “Reasoning with slippery predicates”, Studia Logica 90 (2008), 313-336.
  • “Identity, indiscernibility, and ante rem structuralism:  the tale of i and -i”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 16 (2008), 285-309.
  • “Frege meets Zermelo: a perspective on ineffability and reflection” (with Gabriel Uzquiano), Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2008), 241-266.
  • “The objectivity of mathematics”, Synthese 156 (2007), 337-381.
  • “Where in the (world wide) web of belief is the law of non-contradiction?” (with Jack Arnold), Nous 41 (2007) , 276–297.
  • “Burali-Forti’s revenge, Revenge of the liar, edited by J. C. Beall, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 320-344.
  • “Faith and reason:  the perpetual war”, in Philosophers without gods, 2007, edited by Louise Antony, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3-16.
  • “All things indefinitely extensible” (with Crispin Wright), in Absolute generality, edited by Agustín Rayo, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 255-304.
  • “Structure and identity” in Modality and identity, edited by Fraser MacBride, Oxford University Press, 2006, 109-145.
  • “Computability, proof, and open-texture”, in Church’s thesis after 70 years, edited by Adam Olszewski, Jan Woleński, and Robert Janusz, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006, 420-455.
  • “Context, conversation, and so-called ‘higher-order vagueness’”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 79 (2005), 147-165.
  • “Sets and abstracts”, Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 315-332.
  • “Gurus, logical consequence, and truth-bearers:  What is it that is true?”, in Deflationary truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J.C. Beall, Open Court Publishers, 2005, 153-170.
  • “Categories, structures, and the Frege-Hilbert controversy:  the status of meta-metamathematics”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 13 (2005), 61-77; reprinted in Logicism, intuitionism, and formalism, edited by Sten Lindström et al., Synthese Library 341, Springer, 2009, 435-448.
  • “Logical consequence, proof theory, and model theory”, Oxford handbook for the philosophy of mathematics and logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 651-670.
  • “Higher-order logic”, Oxford handbook for the philosophy of mathematics and logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 751-780.
  • “Simple truth, contradiction, and consistency”, The law of non-contradiction, edited by Graham Priest and J. C. Beall, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 336-354.
  • “The nature and limits of abstraction”, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 166-174.
  • “Foundations of mathematics:  metaphysics, epistemology, structure”, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 16-37.
  • “All sets great and small:  and I do mean ALL”, Philosophical Perspectives 17 (2003), 467-490.
  • “Vagueness and Conversation”, in Liars and Heaps, edited by J. C. Beall and Michael Glanzberg, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 39-72.
  • “Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2003), 19-42.
  • “Prolegomenon to any future neo-logicist set theory: extensionality and indefinite extensibility”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003), 59-91 , 160-189; reprinted in The Arché papers on the mathematics of abstraction, edited by Roy T. Cook, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer, 353-382.
  • “The guru, the logician, and the deflationist”, Noûs 37 (2003), 113-132.
  • “Incompleteness and inconsistency”, Mind 111 (2002), 817-832.
  • “The ‘triumph’ of first-order logic”, Logic, meaning and computation:  memorial volume for Alonzo Church, edited by C. Anthony Anderson and M. Zeleny, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, 219-259.
  • “Frege meets Dedekind:  a neo-logicist treatment of real analysis”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (2000), 335-364 , 160-189; reprinted in The Arché papers on the mathematics of abstraction, edited by Roy T. Cook, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer, 219-252.
  • “The status of logic”, New essays on the a priori, edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, Oxford University Press, 2000, 333-366; reprinted  in part as “Quine on Logic”, Logica Yearbook 1999, edited by Timothy Childers, Prague, Czech Academy Publishing House, 11-21.
  • “Do not claim too much:  Second-order logic and first-order logic”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 7 (1999), 42-64.
  • “Incompleteness, mechanism, and optimism”, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (1998), 273-302.
  • “Proof and truth:  Through thick and thin”, Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998), 493-521.
  • “Logical consequence:  Models and modality”, Philosophy of mathematics today:  Proceedings of an international conference in Munich, ed. by Mathias Schirn, The Mind Association, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 131-156.