Prof. Lin's personal website, Academia page

Selected Publications:
 

• “The Experience Requirement on Well-Being,” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• “Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism about Reasons,” The Philosophical Review 129: 95-130 (2020).
• “Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100: 510-24 (2020).
• “Why Subjectivists about Welfare Needn’t Idealize,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100: 2-23 (2019).
• “Simple Probabilistic Promotion,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96: 360-79 (2018).
• “Welfare Invariabilism,” Ethics 128: 320-45 (2018).
• "Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfactionism and Time,"  in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
• "Enumeration and Explanation in Theories of Welfare," Analysis 77: 65-73 (2017).
• "Against Welfare Subjectivism," Nous 51: 354-77 (2017).
• "How to Use the Experience Machine," Utilitas 28: 314-32 (2016).
• "The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being," The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94: 99-114.
• "Monism and Pluralism," in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy Fletcher (Abingdon, UK: Routledge).
• "Prudence, Morality, and the Humean Theory of Reasons," The Philosophical Quarterly 65: 220-40.
• "Pluralism about Well-Being," Philosophical Perspectives 28: 127-54.