"Knowledge, Justified Belief, and Idealization in Epistemology"
Abstract: Epistemology is concerned, among other things, with the nature of knowledge and also with justified (or rational) belief. Some epistemologists are concerned with knowledge alone, and show little interest in the nature of justified belief. Others concern themselves with justified belief, and show little interest in the nature of knowledge. But even among those who are interested in both of these topics, some begin their investigations with the nature of knowledge, and only then confront the nature of justified belief, while some proceed in the opposite direction. I believe that this difference is not insignificant, and it makes a dramatic difference in the sort of account which results. I will argue that this difference in approach is connected with issues about the role of idealization in epistemology. When these issues are brought into focus, I believe that an important motivation for a Knowledge First approach is revealed, a motivation quite different from what one sees in Williamsonians.
This talk is sponsored by the Miscellaneous Metaphysics, Mind, and Epistemology group.
Reception to following in 314 University Hall
This event is open to the public.
