Words from the Chair

What a year! In addition to further budget cuts, about which I’m sure no one wants to hear another word, we have gone through the first (planning) stage of the “restructuring” process, in which we tried to plumb the depths of our departmental soul to determine in what ways we ought to change if we are to be as good a department as we can be. The result was a document in which we identified our principal strengths—history, value, and what we’ve come to call “the analytical core”—and in which we laid out the directions in which we hope to grow. In part, “growing” will mean making intelligent choices for replacements, as several of our colleagues take advantage of an early-retirement incentive program (see below), and in part it will mean finding the right person for a new position in the history of philosophy. We will begin looking this Fall for someone who specializes in either Early Modern History or Kant, and who will be able to help our increasingly diverse collection of graduate students understand the contributions of women and minorities in the history of our discipline.

Many meetings and much talk went into this document, but we are far from finished. For one thing, the advantages of early retirement may lead as many as five or even six of our faculty to take advantage of the program mentioned above. We certainly don’t want to lose this many people right now, but if we do, we will have to ask ourselves what we want to do by way of replacing them. In the present atmosphere we would ordinarily fear losing one or more faculty lines as retirements occur. However, the College of Humanities has developed a restructuring document of its own, and our department was singled out, along with a few others, as one that would be given special “enhancement” status.

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Jared Monroe

Many of us lost a dear friend, and the department lost a brilliant student, when Jared Monroe died on October 11, 1993. Jared came to Ohio State in the Fall of 1990, with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Tennessee. He had studied there with OSU alums Kathy (Emmett) Bohstedt (Ph.D. 73) and John Nolt (Ph.D. 78). After completing his course requirements and candidacy exam, Jared hoped to work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind.

Jared learned just before coming to graduate school that he suffered from Hodgkin’s Disease, and his long battle with this illness was, for many of us, the most extraordinary and inspiring human drama we had ever been a part of. He had an incredible sense of humor, not an ounce of self-pity, and could alternate hilarious banter and serious philosophy in a way one had to experience to believe. In a departmental memorial service on October 16, Jared’s friends remembered Jared Monroe and Stacey Wise

these and other gifts of his, knowing we are not likely to meet another quite like him for a long, long time.
because of its excellence and promise. Hence, we presently hope to be able to replace all those who retire with suitable junior people.

Another aspect of our on-going restructuring process is the continuation of our efforts to improve our graduate and undergraduate programs. In the last issue of Logos I reported on these efforts, but the work continues. We have introduced a whole new array of courses for undergraduates, especially majors, and we have transformed the graduate program into one in which our students now take seminars, almost exclusively, from their first quarter on campus. Now we plan to turn our attention to the development of entry-level undergraduate courses, in which we hope to combine serious teaching of traditional philosophical issues with social, scientific, and moral issues of more immediate contemporary concern: a course in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind, for example, in which we link traditional concerns about the mind-body problem with recent research in cybernetics, psychology, and linguistics.

We continue to do "pure" research and teaching, of course, in the central, traditional areas of philosophy, and in fact we will host, in October, our second international conference in Ancient Philosophy. Organized by Alan Code and Allan Silverman, the conference will touch on Greek ethics, metaphysics, and science, and will bring to the campus Terry Penner (University of Wisconsin), S. Marc Cohen (University of Washington), John Cooper (Princeton), Richard Kraut (University of Illinois at Chicago), and Gail Fine (Cornell).

A couple of people who have been away will return next year—Neil Tennant from Cambridge, England, and Allan Silverman from Yale—while a number of others will be leaving for a while to do research or to serve as visiting faculty: Diana Raffman will be visiting at Tufts while on a year-long sabbatical, Alan Code will be teaching Spring Quarter at Stanford, and Calvin Normore will be teaching Winter Quarter at the University of California at Riverside. In addition, Charles Kielkopf will be working on a book on Kant while on a year-long sabbatical here in Columbus, and Robert Kraut and Mark Wilson will enjoy special research quarters to continue their research and writing.

We will have more to say about next year’s new graduate students in our next issue, but I can tell you now that once again we have a great new bunch of students. They come to us from some of the country’s most prestigious colleges and universities, including Stanford, Columbia, UC/ Santa Barbara, UC/Davis, the University of Pittsburgh, and Calvin College. Two foreign students will join us as well, one from Seoul National University and another from Cheng-Chi University in Taiwan. As in the past, the philosophical interests of this new class cover a wide range of topics, including issues in science, language, mind, history, and law.

There is other good news too: the Provost has accepted the department’s recommendation and that of the College of Humanities that William Taschék be promoted to associate professor with tenure. And the department has secured permission, at last long, to transfer Stewart Shapiro from our Newark branch to the main campus. I want to extend my congratulations to William and a warm personal welcome to Stu.

I have spared you a discussion of the most recent budget cuts we have sustained, but I’m afraid I cannot spare you my usual concluding appeal for both financial and moral support. Many of you have helped us in the past, both with money and with warm words of encouragement, and I hope you will all think about doing so (again) in the future. As state support dwindles, we are called upon to do more and more for ourselves, and with your help this is something we are prepared to do. Please think seriously about a contribution to "Friends of Philosophy," however small. We promise to use it wisely, and I’d like to think that you know it will be used in a good cause.

Dan Farrell
Alan Code—Our O'Donnell Professor

In 1987 Steve R. and Sarah E. O'Donnell's generous contribution to the department enabled us to establish the Steve R. and Sarah E. O'Donnell Professor of Philosophy. After a long search, the department was very pleased to be able to announce that Alan Code had agreed to fill what we call "The O'Donnell Chair." Marshall Swain, announcing the appointment to the department in 1991 reminded us that throughout our long and sometimes frustrating recruitment efforts we "sought to hire an individual of extraordinary merit and accomplishment, someone who would bring new dimensions to our philosophical life, and new luster to our growing reputation as a department on the move." With the hiring of Alan Code, he said, "our goals have now been met, and our effort properly rewarded. He will bring to our department a reputation and a quality of mind that is among the best in the world."

Alan did both his graduate and undergraduate work in the Philosophy Department of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and after a two year visiting appointment at the University of British Columbia, he joined the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley in 1977. He has taught as a visitor at Princeton, UCLA, and Stanford, and was on the faculty at the University of Michigan before joining our department in the Fall of 1992.

Most of his publications are in the area of Ancient Greek Philoso-

phy, with an emphasis on Aristotle's logic, science, and metaphysics. At the present time he is collaborating with Professor Glenn Most (Heidelberg) and André Laks (Princeton) on a translation with commentary on the middle books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and with Calvin Normore he is co-editor of the "Westview History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy."

Alan's interests include sailing, the history of modern art, and modern dance, and he served for a number of years on the Board of Directors of the San Francisco DanceArt Company.

It has become a tradition that those promoted to or hired at the rank of Professor deliver an inaugural address to the College of Humanities. The last issue of Logos contained synopses of addresses presented by Stewart Shapiro, Neil Tennant, and Mark Wilson. Here we offer a synopsis of Alan's inaugural address, which was presented to the College on April 28, 1993.

Essentialism and Aristotelian Science

Aristotle treats the basic realities, or 'primary substances', of his science as general forms or essences. At least this is how he has been understood by a long tradition of commentary and scholarship. In the past twenty years or so there has been a great deal of important and vigorous debate on this topic, and serious challenges have been made to this interpretation. Much of my own scholarly work has been devoted to elucidating and refining the concepts employed in this controversy, and to restating and defending the orthodox position in light of this clarification. In my inaugural lecture I critically discussed the way in which Aristotle's biological theories have been used to attack the traditional interpretation. My main aim was to demonstrate that the biological passages, far from contradicting the tradition, can in fact be used to illustrate the crucial explanatory role that general essences played in Aristotle's scientific theorizing.

This debate concerns the proper characterization of Aristotelian science. This is a science that attempts to explain the physical world by analyzing its inhabitants into matter and form. The simplest, and most basic kinds of physical stuff are uniform elements (on his theory: earth, water, air and fire), and even the most complex physical objects, living things, are ultimately composed of these simple material elements. However, Aristotle argued against the materialists that a physical object is not just the elements of which it is composed. A substantial form must be present to the matter to make it constitute a member of some natural kind.

Aristotle called the substantial form of a physical object its 'nat-

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ture’ (or in Greek, “physis”), and what is ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ is simply what pertains to something because of its nature. Since in the case of a living thing such as a human its nature just is its soul, no distinction is, or can be, drawn in his science between the physical and the psychological. The soul is here conceived of as the general set of capacities a human being needs in order to live a human life, and it is the presence of these capacities to the material parts that makes one into a human. In general, natural processes are teleological, or goal oriented in the sense that they are directed towards the development and maintenance of this kind of substantial form.

Although it is natural to think of each of us as having our own unique, particular soul, Aristotle has traditionally been interpreted as holding that the substantial forms that serve as the goals of natural processes are universal essences. Each such essence is supposed to be common to all members of some species or natural kind. Recently there have been attacks on this traditional way of understanding Aristotle’s notion of form, and it has been argued that Aristotle’s account of sex-differentiation and inherited characteristics in his Generation of Animals requires that the form that is the primary goal in animal generation is below the species level. If this is correct, then the view that the real goal is a universal essence, or ‘species-form’ is simply a misinterpretation.

According to Aristotelian biology, in animal reproduction the male parent contributes the substantial form, but no material, whereas the female parent contributes the matter. Aristotle further held that a male offspring acquires its maleness from the father, and that any offspring, male or female, can inherit all sorts of other characteristics as well. Opponents of the traditional interpretation have argued that the substantial form must be responsible for those inherited characteristics, and that consequently both the father’s substantial form and that of the offspring must be at a level of specificity much lower than universal essences. In my lecture I argued that the debate about whether forms are particulars or universals is not to be settled by appeal to his theories of animal reproduction. To say that the male contributes the substantial form is not to say that the male contributes nothing but substantial form. This perspective was then used to construct a reading of the biological theory that does not necessitate a departure from the more traditional way of understanding Aristotelian science.

Philosophy 700

Philosophy 700 is a new graduate level course, which was taught for the first time Fall Quarter, 1993. The course has a variable content, depending on who is teaching it. In the first offering, George Pappas and Diana Raffman concentrated on the nature of sensory qualia and the problems which such objects seem to present for functionalist and physicalist theories of the mind.

The course will be taught every Fall quarter, and will limit its enrollment to new graduate students in philosophy. The point of the course is to give the new students a quick introduction to high level philosophical methodology and to help foster a sense of community among the students. To help achieve both of these ends, the course is taught as an advanced seminar, with a maximum of student participation and a great deal of discussion of relevant texts. In the Fall of 1994, the course will be taught by Alan Code and William Taschek, and will focus on the philosophical writings of Donald Davidson.
Ivan Boh’s Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages

Ivan Boh’s book, Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages has been published by Routledge, in the series Topics in Medieval Philosophy, edited by John Marenbon. Ivan explains that his book explores the progressive interest in the pragmatic dimension of language during the later Middle Ages, an interest that complements the semantic and syntactic preoccupation of earlier medieval logic. After noting an attempt to formulate an epistemic conception of entailment propositions before the mid-twelfth century by Garlandus and by Abelard, Ivan offers evidence of epistemic concerns by Burley and Ockham in the first two decades of the fourteenth century, and of an intense interest in epistemic logic at Oxford around 1350 by logicians such as Richard Billingham. He explains how the culmination of this interest in epistemic logic is reached in the fifteenth century north-Italian universities. Ivan’s discussion includes a treatment of a wide range of problems in epistemic logic: iterated epistemic modalities, problems with substitutivity in intentional contexts, and problems of inference from epistemically determined composite senses into divided ones. He concludes the book with a comparison between these medieval endeavors and the epistemic logic of our own times.

Dick Garner’s Beyond Morality

In January, Temple University Press published Dick Garner’s book, Beyond Morality. According to Dick, the book draws on his work in ethics, the philosophy of language, and Asian philosophy to offer a cognitivist form of anti-realism, an error theory that goes further than John Mackie does by suggesting that the ends of morality will be more quickly attained by abandoning morality than by continuing the pretense of objectivity and bondage that supposedly separate morality from whim. The idea of morality is clarified, and the reasons for being suspicious of its claims are laid out. Then in three historical chapters Dick examines the origin of morality in India, China, and Greece—each culture supplying easily identifiable moralists and amoralists. A chapter is devoted to religious morality and another to modern secular attempts to ground moral judgments. All the viable forms of moralism (virtues, values, rights, and rules) are explored and diagnosed, and morality is identified as one (somewhat overrated and safely dispensable) tool of socialization and control.

In the final few chapters Dick shows how a morality-free environment might lead to a more pleasant world than we now inhabit. Buddhists, Stoics, and Daoists have all found a non-evaluative interpretation of the world to be compatible with both action and tranquility. The book ends with a chapter called “Applied Amoralism,” in which Dick explains what an amoralist with an average amount of compassion, curiosity, and fondness for the truth, might have to say about some of the important moral questions of the day.

Tom Kasulis to Direct NEH Seminar on Japanese Philosophy

Tom Kasulis will direct an eight-week Summer Seminar on Japanese thought. Twelve scholars will gather to read in translation important Buddhist, Confucian, and Shinto texts as well as writings by members of the Kyoto School. Tom and his scholars will compare the theories of reality, humanity, and expression of the selected thinkers. The seminar, “Themes in Japanese Philosophy,” is funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities.
Gupta on Truth
by Mark Wilson

Professor Anil Gupta of Indiana University gave a talk to the department on "Truth and Definition" on April 8.

Throughout most of philosophy's career, the notion of "truth" has seemed central to its basic concerns: we wonder "what characteristics must a sentence possess in order to earn the honorific 'true'?" So-called "correspondence theories," for example, maintain that true sentences must match reality according to some established pattern of fit. In recent years, however, many philosophers have questioned whether "truth" deserves this kind of centrality; perhaps its traditional role within philosophical discourse has been exaggerated. Instead, it is now claimed that talk of "truth" is best seen as merely a harmless extension of other ways of talking—once we decide to assert "snow is white," we become also entitled, as a simple matter of stylistic variation, to say that "the sentence 'snow is white' is true." Such a minimalist picture of the role of "truth" is usually called "deflationism" and has been recently defended by Rorty, Horwich, Williams and (perhaps) Quine. Whereas a correspondence theorist maintains that "'snow is white' is true" expresses a complex relationship between the sentence "snow is white" and its worldly correlates, the deflationist sees the truth claim as merely "snow is white" all over again, recast in a variant grammatical guise (analogy: "Loni is loved by Burt" is but a grammatical variant of "Burt loves Loni").

If this was all there was to "true," it would be hard to see why we would want to use the word. Deflationists, however, have proposed a clever answer: we use "true" to facilitate lengthy or infinite conjunctions. Thus, we want to express our agreement with each sentence in The Fall of the Roman Empire;

Ron Laymon and Anil Gupta

unfortunately, doing so will take a lot of time. Appeal to "truth" can turn the trick: we say, "Everything Gibbon wrote is true." This observation leads deflationists to say that "truth" gains its practical value by serving as a "device of infinite conjunction."

Central to the preceding discussion are the so-called "Tarski biconditionals," sentences of the form "'S' is true if and only if S." The core of the deflationist doctrine is the claim that the set of Tarski biconditionals "completely settles the meaning" of "true," no further explication in the manner of correspondence theorists is needed.

Professor Gupta argued that such a position is untenable and based upon a confusion between "fixing the extension of 'true'" and "giving the meaning of 'true'". On the former reading, the biconditionals supply enough of a bridge between non-semantic facts (snow is white) and linguistic facts ("snow is white" says something true) to determine the full set of things that deserve the epithet "true" (the theory of how this works becomes complicated on Gupta's theory when the relevant sentences themselves mention semantical matters). But performing this chore is not the same as "giving the meaning." On the contrary, statements about "truth" often report clearly different information from their non-semantic support. Consider our Gibbon example: on the authority of a trusted friend, I may want to claim that "Everything that Gibbon wrote is true" without having the slightest idea which sentences are in the book. But deflationism sees my sentence as a device for reporting the lengthy conjunction of all the sentences in Gibbon's book—a statement whose hefty information content is fully equal to that contained in The Fall of the Roman Empire! Clearly my weak statement, "Everything that Gibbon wrote is true," scarcely supplies an audience with as much information as reading the full Gibbon. But how can the Tarski biconditionals and the infinite conjunction thesis possibly explain the meaning of "true," when a sentence using "true" and its alleged deflationist surrogate convey vastly different quantities of information?

In addition to his discussion of deflationism, Professor Gupta explained how his positive account of "truth" fits into a wider pattern of "circular definitions," a topic which he feels is just now beginning to receive the attention it deserves.
Searle on Consciousness
by Neil Tennant

How do the workings of the brain cause consciousness? This is the way to enquire after consciousness, according to Professor John Searle, Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California at Berkeley. On April 7 Professor Searle was the first of five distinguished outside speakers to visit OSU during Spring Quarter 1994, to participate in a series entitled “The Foundations of Consciousness.”

William Taschek and Diana Raffman were the members of the department involved in preparing the locals the week before, by critiquing Searle’s arguments in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Similar introductions are being arranged within other departments for the remaining speakers: the linguist Ray Jackendoff, the neurobiologist David Chalmers, the ethologist Donald Griffin and the neurobiologist Dan Schacter. The series was made possible by a grant from the OSU Office of Research to Neil Tennant, to foster interdisciplinary research initiatives.

In his introductory remarks to the capacity interdisciplinary audience that turned out for this exciting and well-publicized event, Neil gave timely warning of Searle’s likely blistering attacks on materialists, dualists, reductionists, eliminativists, introspectionists, Freudians, and functionalists. Sure enough, Searle was not to disappoint. He gave a clear and riveting presentation, opening the series in splendid fashion.

What are the features of consciousness worth theorizing about, and what is their relationship to the brain? For Searle, consciousness is on/off, like a light switch, but with gradations, like a rheostat. It is independent of knowledge, and independent of attention and awareness. The mind-body problem is “no big deal.” All conscious states are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain. Note the word ‘cause’. We are not talking supervenience, or emergent fog. We are talking causation. Brains cause consciousness. The details will be difficult, but the overall relationship is this clear. But the fact that brains can do it does not imply that non-brains cannot do it. There could be artificial consciousness. (So much for the frequent misunderstanding of Searle as thinking that the stuff we are made of is essential to our being conscious). The artificial system would just have to have causal powers equivalent to those of the brain. This is Searle’s biological naturalism, with a dash of catholcity for the philosophically over-exposed.

Which physical processes, states, features and events are causally sufficient for consciousness? This is for neuroscience to say. Which features of consciousness must a theory of consciousness explain? Searle listed eight for starters:

1. Subjectivity, also called privacy, or privileged access. Watch out, Searle said, for this bad argument: Science strives for objectivity; but consciousness is subjective; ergo there can be no science of consciousness.

2. Unity, also called the transcendental unity of apperception by Kantians, or the binding problem by cognitive psychologists.

3. Structuration into discrete units, exhibited in the figure/ground phenomenon.

4. Center/pariphery, or the ability to “zoom in.”

5. Aspects of familiarity. And note that all perception and thought is aspectual.

6. We are always in some mood, even if it is just indifference.

7. Situatedness, manifested in the fact that our consciousness is subject to boundary conditions.

8. Conscious states have intentionalty, or aboutness. They refer beyond themselves.

There are also some cardinal mistakes to avoid:

1. Denying or ignoring consciousness.

2. Behaviorism. That this is wrong can be seen from the post-coital query: “That was great for you. How was it for me?”

3. Functionalism. That this is wrong can be seen from the Chinese Room Argument, which runs: Programs are formal; minds have contents; syntax is not sufficient for semantics; ergo programs cannot be minds.

4. The belief in multiple realizability. ‘Being a symbol’ is not a physical property.
For the Searle of ten years ago, the Chinese Room Argument embodied the insight that semantics was not intrinsic to syntax. For the Searle of today, there is the further insight that syntax is not intrinsic to physics.

The discussion lasted a full and lively hour with questions from specialists in a wide range of disciplines. To the organizers, the event confirmed their belief in the value of having a distinguished philosopher set the stage for this interdisciplinary enquiry.

Neil Tennant and Cambridge Changes

Neil Tennant has returned to his alma mater for a year of research leave. “Dunno about leaving the downtown skyscrapers of Columbus for dem dreamy spires, mon,” he pined from Cambridge, England, in an exclusive phone interview with Logos. “There’s no Katzingers here.” Neil is spending 1993-4 as an Overseas Fellow at Churchill College, on research leave. He arrived there via Kirchberg, Austria, last summer, where he gave an invited paper on automated deduction and artificial intelligence to the International Wittgenstein Colloquium.

Neil’s project is to complete Vol.2 of Anti-Realism and Logic. “You can’t show that reality is not necessarily determinate, and how to think straight, in just one book,” he grumbled. “Seems like you need two.” He’s got a little diverted, though, with some chapters taking on lives of their own. Things have got almost out of hand, both with cognitive significance and with the theory of theory change. “Correction”, he phoned in later after terminating the Logos video-link for some Chateau Neuf du Pape 1976. “Seems like you may need three.”

The main obstacle to deep thought, he finds, is the rigorous punctuality required for High Table. And the diversions provided by the College wine cellars — where, as in Philosophy, there are some impressive, if occasionally brash and cheeky, things from both California and Australia.

Things have changed for the worse since Margaret Thatcher, he says. Petty philosophical crime is now so bad that the last three years’ issues of The Journal of Philosophy are kept in closed stacks in the University Library. One has to order them with special slips. Why? “Students were nicking them.” Why the three years’ backlog? “Cos they can’t afford to have the annual volumes bound.” Despite this evidence of the growing influence of American philosophy on British students, says Neil, it is good to be able to see the local philosophical flavors again. He is participating actively in weekly reading groups in the philosophy of language and in the philosophy of mathematics. He has given papers on new work in progress to the Moral Sciences Club, and in Edinburgh and St. Andrews.

So what have been the high points so far of his stay? “My sweet-heart visited over Christmas. And shortly after that I proved a Quadrant Theorem, showing that empirical significance needn’t be conceded to metaphysical terms, even in logically equivalent re-formulations of the union of an empirical theory with a metaphysical theory.” More of a high interval than a high point, he says, has been “hanging out with my kids. Cate trained up with me for her SATs, and has got into Dartmouth. Liz is finishing her second year in English Literature here. She’s just finished a dissertation on rhetoric and erotica in sixteenth century love poetry.”

What has been his biggest disappointment over there? “Not being able to vote in South Africa’s first general election,” he said. “They wouldn’t accept my birth certificate at South Africa House in London. They wanted the plastic ID card I got at age 16 from the apartheid regime. Some things never change.”

Kim Holle Moves to Library

Kimberly Holle, a member of the department staff for almost 13 years and an OSU employee for more than 22 years, accepted a position in the Friends of the Libraries office in November, 1993. Kim’s decision to move was spurred by the most recent wave of budget cuts which led to the abolishment of her position in the department. Happily, Kim found a comparable position that she enjoys which will also allow her to complete her doctoral studies in Marriage and Family Therapy. In fact, the upcoming year will be a busy one for Kim. Not only is she learning new skills through her employment, she will be completing the second phase of her clinical internship and beginning the fieldwork for her dissertation — all while single-parenting an active 14-year old. The one downside of the change, according to Kim, is not being able to interact with students on a consistent basis. An open invitation to visit her in 112 Main Library, however, is extended to her friends in the department.
Words from the Graduate Students

Quite a few students have received M.A.'s since Logos was last published: Jeff Koperski, Al Lent, Tycerium Lightner, Adam Moore, and Sheldon Smith. Jill Dieterle and Byungok Kwon have both earned Ph.D.'s. Jill is considering a number of employment options and attended the APA meeting in Kansas City, as did Ed Slowik, who will receive his Ph.D. soon. Kwon is planning to return to Korea to teach. Finally, we have just learned that Mike Watkins has accepted a tenure-track position at Auburn University.

Words from the Undergraduate Students

An enriching activity for philosophy under-graduates is the Undergraduate Philosophy Forum. In the forum students can discuss philosophically interesting topics with their favorite professors in a more relaxed atmosphere than the classroom and follow it up with a couple of beers at Larry's. Although the turnout this year has been low, the future looks promising. This year's president, Barnett McGowan, will be graduating in June, but both the next president, Steven Blatti, and most of the members should be around actively participating for a few years. We have been blessed this year with good speakers and interesting topics. Some of the more notable ones have been “Cross-Cultural Evaluation in a Pluralistic World,” by John Champlin; Philosophical Ramifications of Chaos,” by Robert Batterman; “Keeping the Skeptic at Bay,” by Marshall Swain; “Postmodernism with an Attitude,” by Peter King; and “Beyond Morality,” by Dick Garner. For the final event of the Spring Quarter we are anticipating a presentation by Robert Kraut.

Words from the Alumni

Carmenta Clark Abbott (B.A. Philosophy 1959; Ph.D. Romance Languages, 1972) is currently an Associate Professor of French in the Department of Italian and French at St. Jerome's College of the University of Waterloo, Ontario. She reports: “As my three children were growing up I was heavily involved in promoting French second language learning opportunities for (Canadian) children. Now in my ‘incarnation’ as a university professor I teach language, literature, and civilization to students who benefitted from strong elementary and secondary school language programs. In my research, I specialize in literature of the century of Descartes and, as such, stay on ‘friendly terms’ with matters philosophical.”

Al Flores (Ph.D. 1974) was recently named chair of the Department of Philosophy at California State University at Fullerton, as well as being elected Chair of the Academic Senate. His most recent publication, “AIDS: Moral Dilemmas for Physicians,” appears in AIDS: Crisis in Professional Ethics, ed. by E. Cohen and M. Daves, and Published by Temple University Press.


Words about the Faculty

Steve Boer's "Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology" has appeared in Synthese.

In December, Alan Code presented an Invited Paper at the Eastern Division APA. The title was "Logical Theses and Aristotle’s Science of Being." In January, he gave a talk, "Metaphysics and Biology in Aristotle,"
to the Philosophy Department Colloquium at Denison University. In April, at the Pacific Division Meetings of the APA, he participated in a symposium on “New Work in the Philosophy of Greek Mathematics.” Later in April he offered colloquia to the departments at Reed College and the University of Texas at Austin. In May Alan participated in a Faculty Panel on multiculturalism, an event commemorating the College’s 25th anniversary year. Alan’s paper, “Vlastos on a Metaphysical Paradox,” appeared in Aperion, vol 26. This special issue of Aperion, “Virtue, Love, and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos,” is edited by T.H. Irwin and Martha C. Nussbaum.

In April, Dan Farrell presented “Deterrence and the Just Distribution of Harm” at a conference of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, at Bowling Green State University.

On June 8, Dick Garner will discuss his book, Beyond Morality, at the Worthington Mall Little Professor Book Center, in connection with the Faculty Author Series.

March was a busy month for Ron Laymon. On the 17th he presented his paper “Causation in Science and the Law: Are They the Same?” at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, at Blacksburg, Virginia. From there he traveled to The University of North Carolina at Greensboro to deliver “Nightmares Suggested by Underdeterminism: The Cavendish Experiment” at the Seventeenth Annual Greensboro Symposium in Philosophy. Finally, on the 27th, he presented “Defenses Against Charges of Artistic Failure: Some Legal Analogies” at a Symposium: “Aesthetics with an Attitude Problem,” at the Pacific Division of the APA. This paper has been selected by the meeting organizers to be published (along with other selected papers from that meeting) in Philosophical Studies.

Diana Raffman’s “Vagueness Without Paradox” has been published by The Philosophical Review. Diana was the 1994 Visiting Scholar of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Maine, where she gave four talks on the philosophy of music. She will be a visiting fellow at Tufts Center for Cognitive Science during the 1994-95 school year.

Stewart Shapiro was invited to give a plenary address to the annual meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, in Gainesville in March. His “Modality and Ontology” has just been published in Mind.

Bob Turnbull will be at Vanderbilt University in May, where he will deliver a paper at the first session of a conference: “Platonism, Neoplatonism, the Mathematical Tradition, and early Modern Science.” His session is entitled “Plato’s Mathematical Philosophy” and his presentation will be discussed by Patricia Card and Steven Strange. Bob will also lead a breakfast discussion to wrap up the conference on the final morning. Peter Machamer will present his work at a session on “Early Modern Science and Mathematics.” In another session of the conference Peter King will present a paper on “Medieval Mathematical Thought” to which Calvin Normore will offer a response. The Conference will be sponsored by The International Society for Neoplatonic Studies.

Voyagers

Alan Code was in Florence from October 30 till November 8, working with Professor Glenn Most (University of Heidelberg) on a new English translation of the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

Ron Laymon was invited to give a presentation at an International Seminar organized by the Philosophical Society of Finland on the topic, “Structuralism, Idealization and Approximation.” The title of Ron’s paper was “Idealizations and Counterfactuals: A Computational Analysis.” The seminar was held at the University of Helsinki from September 30 till October 2, 1993, and Ron’s visit was funded by the Philosophical Society of Finland. Ron was the only participant from the United States in the conference which drew participants from Germany, Spain, Poland, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Finland.

Andy Oldenquist will be a Visiting Professor at Leipzig University during the months of April, May, and June, where he will teach two seminars: “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Tolerance” and “Private Interest and the Public Good.”

In August Diana Raffman read her paper “Vagueness Without Paradox” at the 1993 Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria.

Stewart Shapiro was invited to present a paper at a conference entitled “Philosophy of Mathematics Today,” held in Munich in July, 1993. He presented “Logical consequence: Models and modality,” which is a pilot for a new project on logical consequence.
Humanities Alumni Society Calls for 1994-95 Award Nominations

The College of Humanities Awards of Distinction will give public recognition to those men and women who have brought distinction to themselves, the College of Humanities, and The Ohio State University through their participation, commitment, and leadership in their chosen professions and/or through public service.

1. Nominees should have successfully completed a degree in the College of Humanities (B.A., M.A., and/or Ph.D.).
2. Two awards shall be presented annually.
3. Current members of the faculty or staff of The Ohio State University and members of the College of Humanities Alumni Society Board of Governors are not eligible for these awards.
4. Nominees should have demonstrated at least one of the following: achievement and excellence in their profession and/or contributions and activity in public service.
5. Recipients will include alumni from a broad base of experience and will reflect diversity.
6. Recipients should be present to accept the award at the Alumni Awards Reception on March 10, 1995.

Nominating statements must be limited to the space provided below. Additional supporting documentation, such as a biographical sketch, curriculum vitae, or résumé, may be attached. Nominators should take care to address the specific criteria of the award when writing the nomination. If multiple nominations are received for an individual, the Awards Committee will consider the most complete and representative one. Should letters of support be submitted, not more than three will be accepted, and each must be limited to one 8 1/2” x 11” page.

The decisions of the Awards Committee, members of the Alumni Association Board of Directors, or their appointees, will be guided by the materials submitted by the nominator within the prescribed guidelines. Members of the Awards Committee will make the final determination of material to be submitted to the Awards Committee. The Humanities Alumni Society will not underwrite expenses of bringing award recipients to the campus for the awards program or associated activities.

Mail nominations and supporting documentation to: College of Humanities Awards Committee, 186 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210. Deadline for nominations is December 2, 1994.

I nominate ___________________________ Class of ____________ for a 1995 College of Humanities Award of Distinction because:

Nominee’s Name

Nominee’s Address

Nominee’s Phone Number

Nominated by

Nominator’s Address

Nominator’s Phone Number

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What’s new with you? Whether or not you decide to become a member of the Friends of Philosophy, please inform us of your current whereabouts, your work, career changes, promotions, publications, etc. In future issues we will continue to devote a section to news about alumni (whether holding advanced degrees or not).
1993-94 Colloquia and Talks of Interest

October 7 Robert Schwartz, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, "Is Mathematical Competence Innate?: Reflections on Recent Psychological Evidence"

October 8 Margaret Atherton, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, "Berkeley without God"

October 22 Eileen O'Neill, Queens College and CUNY Graduate School, "Cartesian Women, Feminine Philosophy, and the Via Media between the Ancients and the Moderns"

November 5 Alvin Plantinga, The University of Notre Dame, "What's the Question?"

January 14 Laurence Bonjour, University of Washington, "What is it Like to be a Human?"

February 11 James Joyce, The University of Michigan, "A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism"

February 14 Ian Muller, The University of Chicago, "Platonism and the Study of Nature"

March 4 Sally Sedgwick, Dartmouth College, "Hegel's Critique of Kant's Categorical Imperative"

March 11 Lawrence Sklar, The University of Michigan, "idealization and Explanation: A Case Study from Statistical Mechanics"

March 14 Marleen Rozemond, Stanford University, "Descartes on the Union of Mind and Body"

March 28 Professor Robert Stainaker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Reference and Necessity"

April 4 Glen Most, University of Heidelberg, "Ancient Greece as Utopia: The Use and Abuse of Classical Antiquity"

April 7 John Searle, University of California, Berkeley, "The Rediscovery of the Mind"

April 8 Anil Gupta, Indiana University, "Definition and Truth"

April 11 Sten Ebbesen, University of Copenhagen, "Boethius of Dacia on Knowledge and Scientific Theory"

April 22 Eric Lewis, McGill University, "In What Sense are Simple Bodies Simple?: Aristotle on Compositional and the Elements"

May 11 Richard Butrick Ohio University, "A Type-Free System of Higher Order Logic"

May 25 John Josephson, The Ohio State University, "Abductive Inference"

June 1 E. Karger, C.N.K.S., Paris, "Mental Sentences and the Objects of Belief"