



LOGOS

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A NEWSLETTER FROM THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Words from the Chair

This has been a year of almost unbelievable change for the department—some good, some bad. The bad developments have been entirely budgetary: we have had to try to do more with less, and as we go to press we are expecting final word on exactly how extensive our next cut will be. I can't tell you how grateful I am to our faculty, staff, and students for all they've done to make it possible for us to absorb, without serious damage to our programs or our morale, the cuts we've taken so far. And, of course, I can't possibly express the gratitude we feel to all the alums and other friends who have been kind enough to send monetary help in this time of need.

So much for the bad news. The rest is good, and some of it is very good news indeed. As many of you already know, we have completely revised our graduate program, doing away with the old-style generals and replacing them with what we hope is both a more humane and a more growth-enhancing alternative. Graduate students will now select a Generals Committee sometime before the end of their second year, assemble, with the Committee's help, a bibliography of important works in some special area of philosophy, and then undergo both a written and an oral exam on these works early in their third year. Concur-

rently, we have extensively revised the graduate curriculum, so that virtually all the courses our graduate students take, from their first quarter to their last, will be graduate seminars.

Nor has our undergraduate program remained unchanged. Undergraduate majors now have a

much wider range of history courses from which to choose in satisfying their three-course history requirement, and, with these courses now taught at the three- rather than the five-hundred level, students will be fulfilling the history requirement a bit earlier in their careers. This will enable

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The Fink Prize

The William H. Fink Prize in Philosophy was won this year by **Mike Watkins**, for his paper "Dispositionalism, Ostension, and Austerity." Mike holds a B.A. (1981) and an M.A. (1986) from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, and is currently completing work on his dissertation.

Three of our students tied for second place this year: **Jill Dieterle** for "Is Julius Caesar Identical to?," **Pierluigi Miraglia** for "Irrealism Deflated:

The Status of Content and the Vagaries of Truth," and **Ed Slowik** for "The Structure of Absolute Space and Time: Newton's Argument Against Cartesian Relationalism."

This year, thanks to our late benefactor's generosity, the prize for the winning paper was \$1000. The writers of the three second place papers each received \$200. After the presentation of Mike's paper, the winners and their guests were treated to dinner at Deja Vu.



*From left:
Jill Dieterle,
Ed Slowik,
Mike Watkins,
Pierluigi
Miraglia*

them to go on to take some of the newly-created four-hundred-level courses we have recently put in place, including, among others, four-hundred-level courses in ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind.

Good news of another sort includes a much-deserved promotion to full professor for Robert Kraut and first jobs (!) for Jody Graham and Laura Keating. Jody will be returning to Canada to teach the history of philosophy at St. Mary's University in Halifax, and Laura will be travelling, with recent grad Steve Bayne (her husband), to Hunter College in New York City, where she too will be teaching the history of philosophy. Receiving his doctorate along with Jody and Laura this quarter is Mike LaBossiere, who will be freelancing in Florida for a while as he seeks to find a teaching job that will keep him close enough to his fiancée, Barbara Bender, who left us only recently for graduate study at Florida State University, after completing a bachelor's and master's with us.

What does the future now appear to hold for us, other than more budget cuts? One thing we know we'll see, thanks to the tireless efforts of our new graduate-recruitment committee, is a really fine group of new graduate students: three fellows, eight T.A.s, and a surprisingly large number of highly-qualified students who have elected to come for at least a year even though they will have to pay their own way. They will be welcomed in September when returning students are welcomed back, along with our faculty and staff, and I hope

everyone reading this will feel free to attend our beginning-of-the-year party. It would be wonderful to see you. For information about the details, just call the department in mid-September.

Next year will be the twenty-fifth anniversary of the College of Humanities—it existed before then as part of the old College of Arts and Sciences—and various activities are currently being planned, both by the College and the departments. We will, of course, keep you posted on our own particular plans as they develop, but for now I want to urge you to contact the department to make sure you are on our colloquium mailing list, since most of us feel the best way a philosopher can celebrate almost anything is either to give or to attend a good philosophical talk.

These are happy times for the department, despite the fiscal darkness that seems increasingly to surround us. However, it appears more and more likely that we will not be able to carry on our work, at least as we want to do, without increasing support from private individuals and groups. I'm afraid you can expect to be hearing more from me, therefore, in the coming year, about how much we need your help. Of particular importance in this connection is the fund we call "Friends of Philosophy." Among other things, it supports the Gluck Library and its resources, which, in turn, support so much of what we are about, both in our professional research and in our teaching efforts.

— Dan Farrell

Abelard Conference/Workshop

On May 1 and 2 the department sponsored a conference on the "Thought of Peter Abelard". Participants attended sessions offering both prepared academic papers and workshops. **Calvin Normore** organized the event, which was supported by money from the Melton Center and from an anonymous donor.

The conference began on Saturday morning with **Peter King's** "New Abelard Texts," in which he described the current state of the edition of Abelard's *Logica ingredientibus* and talked about two new secondary witnesses to the text, student notes and pastiches of Abelard's lectures. The conference ended at noon on Sunday with Calvin's "Abelard, Ethics and Judaism," a discussion of Abelard's criticism of the Natural-Law tradition as radically incomplete, with a description of Abelard's solution and some criticisms of it.

The other papers/workshops were: **Stephen Menn** (McGill), "Abelard and Stoicism"; **Ian Wilks** (Toronto), "An Organizing Idea in Abelard's Semantics"; **Christopher Martin** (Auckland), "Abelard and Inference"; and **Neil Lewis** (Georgetown), "Abelard and Modality".

The conference resulted in important exchanges of information, and much informal discussion. The group is hoping to meet again next year, perhaps to discuss the thought of Boethius.

The New Graduate Program

The Philosophy Department has spent a good deal of effort this past year in rethinking the structure of its graduate program, trying to streamline the Ph.D. requirements while maintaining a high level of quality. The two most far-reaching changes have to do with the General Examination and with seminars. The General Examination now no longer is a battery of sit-down exams covering all of philosophy. Instead, students will put together bibliographies that cover an area of philosophy, drawn up in consultation with a committee. That committee will then examine the student in the area in question. The department also wants students to get into seminars more rapidly. There will be a new required course for all first-year graduate students in the Fall Quarter they arrive. Additionally, the department will offer more graduate seminars and require students to take more of them. There will be much less by way of mixing professional training for graduate students in with liberal education for undergraduates.

These changes were motivated by the desire to get out of the way—to encourage students to have a much more active role in their own education. To this end, several program requirements were modified or dropped altogether. There are fewer distribution requirements, and the core course requirements have been cancelled. The old core courses

will be offered on a regular basis, and the department hopes that students will take them as need and interest dictate.

The net result should be a leaner, cleaner Ph.D. program, where students become self-starters and discover how to pursue depth in a field. This new program will be phased in over a two-year period to ease the transition.



Allan Gibbard

Allan Gibbard: "Is Meaning Normative?"

by Don Hubin

Professor Allan Gibbard of the University of Michigan gave a long-anticipated colloquium to the department on May 14th. His talk, drawn from the Hempel Lectures presented at Princeton University, applied the theory of norm expressivism developed in his book, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A*

Theory of Normative Judgment, to the theory of meaning. Gibbard sought to explicate in what sense it might be true that "meaning is normative" and to see what implications the normativity of meaning had for his theory of normative judgment, and vice versa.

If meaning is normative, then metaethics and the philosophy of language include important parts of each other. Not only is that portion of metaethics concerned with the meaning of moral terms a part of the philosophy of language, as we knew already, but that portion of the philosophy of language concerned with the meaning of 'meaning' will be a part of metaethics—if not in the standard sense, then in one expanded to include the study of the nature of normativity generally.

Gibbard takes normative judgments to be expressions of the acceptance of norms; to judge that one ought to perform an action, accept a belief, etc., is to express your acceptance of norms that recommend the doing of that act or acceptance of that belief. To hold that meaning is normative, then, is to hold that asserting that someone means something entails the expression of the acceptance of norms. Gibbard argues that meaning has a dual function: explanation and assessment. The first involves only "pseudo-normative" uses of 'ought' (like, for example, the 'ought' of explanation). The latter, though, involves a genuinely normative use of 'ought'.

A lively discussion followed the presentation and was continued at a party held in Professor Gibbard's honor.



Robert Kraut Promoted to Full Professor

The department has promoted **Robert Kraut** to the rank of full professor. Robert works primarily in metaphysics, but his theories intersect with the philosophy of language, the philosophy of art, and the philosophy of mind. His sustaining interest is the concept of *objectivity*—what it is and why it matters. Disputes rage among literary theorists about whether textual meaning is objective, and whether there is such a thing as “the correct interpretation of the text.” Other disputes rage among philosophers, scientists, and psychophysicists about whether *color* is an objective feature of the external world (or merely a “creation of the mind” imposed upon external reality). Moral realists argue with moral projectivists about whether there are moral

facts, or whether moral predicates express real properties. Robert argues that these disputes—despite their popularity—are unclear because they depend upon poorly-understood metaphysical concepts such as *objectivity*, *mind-dependence*, and *facthood*. Thus he raises neglected questions: What would it be for there to exist—or not exist—objective facts of a certain sort? What is it for a predicate to express a real property? How does descriptive discourse differ from expressive discourse? What conditions must be satisfied if attributions of *correctness* and *incorrectness* are to be appropriate? Robert’s answers to these questions ramify across the web of philosophical problems. He suggests a way to look at arguments about objectivity, and a theory about the role traditionally played by such arguments.

One consequence of Robert’s investigations involves the nature of human emotion. He locates what he calls a “cognitivist prejudice” in much of the traditional literature on the emotions. This is the view that the “aboutness” of emotion, and the susceptibility of emotional states to criticism, can be explained only on the assumption that emotions somehow “contain” beliefs or judgments as constituents. Robert argues that emotions can be construed as non-judgmental feelings of a “context-sensitive” sort; and he claims that this way of looking at things makes better sense of the intentionality of emotion and the susceptibility of emotion to appraisal.

Robert is also a working jazz guitarist (he has played with Jack McDuff, Lenny White, Eric Kloss, and presently appears with the


Columbus band IBADA). His direct involvement in the arts, combined with his interests in objectivity, have led him to theorize about the concept of *correctness* in the context of music performance and music criticism. What, he asks, does it mean to say that music can be misunderstood—that listeners fail to perceive a performance correctly? How does understanding music relate to other phenomena such as understanding natural language or understanding scientific data? Robert has developed a theory of musical understanding and musical significance that illuminates aspects of the music world traditionally neglected (or distorted) by both philosophers and music theorists. His theory is especially interesting because it is solidly rooted in both data and theory: It grows out of his experiences as a performer, and is also shaped by the theory of objectivity that drives his work in other branches of metaphysics.

Robert’s present work concerns the metaphysics of modality and the relation between objectivity and the concept of an *object*. He is also developing the idea that semantic discourse—discourse about reference, meaning, and truth-conditions—serves not to state facts about language/world connections but rather to express commitments of various sorts. His article “Robust Deflationism,” which has just appeared in *The Philosophical Review*, places this idea within a larger philosophical context and defends it against recent criticisms.

Diana Raffman's Book

In February of this year **Diana Raffman's** book, *Language, Music, and Mind*, was published by MIT Press. Diana offers the following characterization of her work: The book provides a cognitivist account of the nature and etiology of ineffable (i.e., verbally inexpressible) musical knowledge. I invoke recent theories in linguistics and cognitive psychology in order to isolate three kinds of musical ineffability—what I call access, feeling, and nuance ineffabilities. The most important of the three, the nuance ineffability, attaches to our sensory-perceptual knowledge of the fine-grained expressive nuances of musical performances. I compare my account of musical ineffability to some more traditional views, in particular those of Stanley Cavell and Nelson Goodman. Along the way, I make a detailed comparison of linguistic and musical understanding, culminating in an attack upon the familiar idea that human emotions constitute musical meanings. In a concluding chapter, I explore some negative implications of my account of ineffability for

Daniel Dennett's propositional theory of consciousness.



Three Inaugurals

The College of Humanities Inaugural Lecture Series provides those faculty members who have recently attained the rank of full professor, as well as faculty newly hired at that rank, a forum in which they can discuss their creative research and professional interests with their colleagues and with interested individuals from the University community. This issue of *Logos* contains synopses of recent Inaugural Lectures by **Stewart Shapiro**, **Neil Tennant**, and **Mark Wilson**. A synopsis of **Alan Code's** Inaugural Lecture will appear in the next issue of *Logos*.

"When Words Go Wrong (Or Right)"

by Mark Wilson

My lecture attempts to reconcile a gradualist approach to learning with the apparent suddenness and vividness with which concepts are frequently acquired.

With respect to "gradualism," I start with a view of language akin to that of W. V. Quine, for whom the acquisition of sentences (as opposed to individual words) is central in the learning process. I then make three predictions about the linguistic development of concepts over time:



Mark Wilson

1. the development is often haphazard, hinging upon quirks of the historical setting;

2. it is frequently localized to patches of language rather than extending across the full field of sentences permitted by the language's grammar;

3. a pattern of "split localism" may emerge: that is, an initial linguistic base evolves that is incompatible with different local patches of a language.

At first glance, these predictions seem to contradict our strong sense that we can completely grasp the meanings of many words in a flash: "Ah ha!" we say, "now I properly understand what X means." I suggest that it is profitable to compare this sense of firm understanding with the claims of the instantaneous grasp of plot or proof frequently made by novelists and mathematicians. Theories of creativity suggested by Henry James and others point the way to a means of checking for isomor-

phism between apparently unrelated fields and of explaining how we come to feel that we have suddenly grasped a "core of meaning." This analysis reveals that the phenomenon of "sudden grasp of meaning" harmonizes nicely with the general predictions about localized conceptual growth suggested above.

We may conclude, then, that our moments of semantic epiphany—when we most warmly feel that we have captured the true heart of old words—often signal occasions where new courses in language begin.

"Logic and its Place in Nature"

by Neil Tennant

I want to advance a conception of logic that has its roots in Kant's conception of pure, general logic but which makes some principled departures from it in the light of recent developments in the theory of meaning and of proof. I see logic as consisting in a body of rules that are a priori, analytic, and formal; which are moreover normative and non-empirical; and which contain within themselves the seeds of their own justification. This conception allows us to consign to the sphere of logic, along with the rules for the standard logical operators, some fundamental fragments of arithmetic, projective geometry, and set (or class) theory. The existential commitments of the latter are innocuous. By contrast, the classical logical principle of bivalence (or

law of excluded middle) should be rejected as a logical principle precisely because it is synthetic in a non-innocuous way.

This conception of logic will allow one to argue for revision of classical logic and for the accommodation of much of mathematical thought as fundamentally logical. Most importantly, these developments flow from a conception of logic as consisting of a body of a priori and formal rules.

The rules of inference will also have to be chosen and justified in the spirit of Quine's behaviorism, which insists that meaningfulness is a wholly public matter. But we will allow ourselves the view, pace Quine, that they are the right rules because they provide the correct model for the determinate and humanly graspable meanings of the logical operators.

In my book *Anti-Realism and Logic* (Claredon Press, 1987) I tried to show how this conception favors the choice of intuitionistic relevant logic. For convenience I shall call it nice logic. Nice logic is intuitionistic because it eschews the move "P and not-P, so Q," and it is relevant because it eschews the move "either P or not-P." Nice logic is adequate for the scientific method. It can uncover all inconsistencies. Nice logic is adequate for constructive mathematics. It can uncover any intuitionistic consequence of any consistent set of axioms.

The naturalizing tendency in the philosophy of mind and language makes it *prima facie* mysterious how the so-called logical words of our language could be invested with meanings that dictate certain rules as correct. How can the naturalist cope with the normativity of meaning, espe-

cially of the logical operators? How can the naturalist agree with my claim that these are indeed the right rules for the logical operators, insofar as we manifestly grasp their meanings?

I think the answer is that we do not have meanings, of mysterious origin and status, dictating certain rules as correct. Rather, we have certain rules (and only those rules) succeeding in specifying manifestly graspable meanings. The focus of attention shifts, then, to these rules. How do they come to be adopted? How are they maintained? How do they command adherence? Would widespread violation of them be possible without the language ceasing to be a vehicle of survival-relevant information?

I see the rules of inference as transcendental preconditions for the very possibility of informative communication. From a naturalistic communitarian perspective, one can explain how such communication could arise, be selected for, and in turn confer selective advantage on genes that code for organs that code and decode. But those logical constraints in the background are what make the evolutionary scenario possible.

Whether naturalism can accommodate normativity is one of the deepest challenges to philosophy and cognitive science. As we go scientific about cognition, we can be seduced by imagery of mechanisms, mechanisms that can misfire. We are tempted to think only in terms of contingent cause and effect; and at best in terms of the functional, ever prone to malfunction, or the teleological, prone also to the imperfections of evolutionary design and the sacrifices made in satisficing.

These temptations make us lose sight of one of the most pressing issues in our quest for understanding. That issue is: How does the normativity of human reason sit with the sheer physicality of its substrate? Where, in a world of fallible mechanisms, does the "hardness of the logical must," as Wittgenstein called it, get a look-in? How can a transcendently unaided nature select the nice?

"Structure, Mathematics, and Philosophy"

by Stewart Shapiro

Long before the Academy decided to pigeon-hole itself into colleges and departments, philosophy and mathematics enjoyed a close relationship—more than a mere fascination with each other. For example, throughout history, many major philosophers were also major mathematicians. The names of Descartes, Leibniz, and Pascal come readily to mind; and closer to our own times, there is Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Hilbert, and Gödel. From the other perspective, in the past, virtually all philosophers, from all conceivable schools, were aware of the state of mathematics, and took it seriously for their work. But today, we are more specialized, even in philosophy.

My field is philosophy of mathematics. Its purpose is to give an account of mathematics and the place of mathematics in

our overall intellectual lives. It is easier to characterize a branch of philosophy by giving a list of the questions it asks rather than the answers it provides. Here are some questions: What is the subject matter of mathematics—what is it all about? What are numbers, points, geometric figures, sets, functions, Hilbert spaces, etc.? What is the methodology of mathematics? How is it practiced? How is it possible for us to learn mathematics? Why do the results of mathematics seem so certain, necessary, and a priori? In short, a philosophy of mathematics should tell us something about numbers and something about ourselves. An interesting and, I think, more central question is this: What is the relationship between mathematics and the other sciences? Consider, for example, the amount of mathematics presupposed by any branch of natural or social science. Galileo once wrote that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. This is true, and gives something of a hint, but we have little idea of what it means.

One might wonder about the relationships, if any, between mathematics and philosophy. Some bad philosophy resulted from paying too much attention to mathematics or giving mathematics the wrong kind of attention. In describing some of my courses, I invoke what I call "Shapiro's thesis": the fact that many central problems in contemporary philosophy are also remarkably central to the philosophy of mathematics. In other words, mathematics makes a good case study for a philosopher.

As I conceive it, philosophy of mathematics is not, or should not be, an activity solely engaged in by philosophers for their own reasons. Rather, philosophy of mathematics

is done by those who care about mathematics and want to understand its role in the overall intellectual enterprise. A mathematician who adopts philosophy of mathematics should gain something by this: an orientation towards work and at least a tentative guide to its direction—what sorts of problems are important, what questions should be posed, etc.—and, as a teacher, should gain insight into how to present findings to others.

Voyagers

- **Alan Code** spent December and January in Florence, where he worked at the Biblioteca Medica Laurenziana with a 12th Century manuscript of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.
- **Andy Oldenquist** traveled to Reykjavik, Iceland in May, where he read a paper, "In Defense of Ethnic Nationalism," at the World Congress of Legal and Social Philosophy. In June, Andy made a presentation, "Philosophy and Democratization," at Herten Pedagogical University in St. Petersburg, Russia. He will be going to Schula, Russia in August to participate in a conference on Democratization.
- In May, **George Pappas** gave a paper on Berkeley and Scepticism at meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Ottawa. In June, he presented a paper entitled "Experts" at a conference on Connectionism and Philosophy of Mind, in Bled, Slovenia.

- **Jim Scanlan** spent a month (March 11 - April 10) in Moscow holding discussions with Russian philosophers and gathering material for the quarterly journal he edits, *Russian Studies in Philosophy*. During his stay, he delivered a plenary address on the subject "Does Russia Need Russian Philosophy?" at a conference cosponsored by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Transnational Institute of the United States. He also gave two talks at the Institute of Philosophy on the subjects "The Teaching of Philosophy in the United States" and "The Preparation of New English-Language Dictionaries and Encyclopedias of Philosophy."

- **Neil Tennant** delivered "Manifestation without Verification?" to a Workshop on Meaning Theory and Verification at the University of Leiden, in September, 1992. This August he will present "Artificial Intelligence and Automated Deduction" to the International Wittgenstein Colloquium, in Kirchberg, Austria.



Laura Keating

Words from the Graduate Students

Back again this spring quarter was the graduate student colloquium, which featured many of the top graduate students of the department. These biweekly talks were of the same format as most professional colloquia and were quite interesting and informative for all participants. **Jeff Scott** started out the series by reading a paper entitled "Ethical Theory in Leibniz." **Jeff Koperski** read "NOA and Constructive Empiricism: A Question of Compatibility." This was followed by **Tylerium Lightner**, who read "Separability and Conceivability in Hume." **John Chaplin** then read "Moral and Rational Perfection and the Divergence Thesis." The spring series ended with a recent graduate, **Norm Mooradian**, reading "Hedonism and Motivation in Plato's *Protagoras*."

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Norm Mooradian and **Laura Keating** have both earned their Ph.D. s. Norm is looking at a number of employment options at this time, while Laura has accepted a teaching position at Hunter College.

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Soon to graduate with the Ph.D. is **Michael LaBossiere**, who has been extra busy lately. Mike conducted a guest lecture entitled "The Varieties of Feminism" and a colloquium on his paper "The Problem of Universals and Philosophic Legacy," both at Florida State University. Mike also has a

paper, "Body and Environment" forthcoming in the journal *Environmental Ethics*. He has also been expanding his non-philosophy career in fiction writing by authoring *Nightsider* and coauthoring *Protect and Serve*.

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Erdinc Sayan also has a paper, "Is Marxist Philosophy Withering Away?" forthcoming in *Studies in East European Thought* (formerly *Studies in Soviet Thought* interestingly enough).

Words about the Faculty

Robert Batterman received a NSF Fellowship for the Summer of 1992. In October of 1992, he presented an invited paper on Quantum Chaos at the Philosophy of Science Association. Also in 1992, his "Explanatory Instability" appeared in *Nous*, and "Quantum Chaos and Semiclassical Mechanics" in the proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association. His "Defining Chaos" appeared in *Philosophy of Science*, 1993.

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In December, **Alan Code** joined with Kit Fine to present a session on "Aristotle's Conception of Mixtures" at the Los Angeles Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. In March, he gave three invited lectures on Aristotle's biology and metaphysics at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Later that month, he replied to a paper on the concept of essence by Kit Fine at the Pacific Division American Philosophical

Association meeting in San Francisco. In April, he gave an invited paper at a conference at Villanova University on "Metaphysical Themes in the *Generation of Animals*." His session was entitled "Metaphysical Essentialism and Aristotle on Inherited Characteristics." He then gave two talks at Cornell University: "Essentialism and the Life Sciences in Aristotle" and "The Development of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*". He concluded the month by presenting his Inaugural Lecture "Essentialism in Aristotelian Science" in April. In May, he presented a paper to the Philosophy Department of the University of Cincinnati. On July 1 and 2, Alan will be an instructor at the NEH Summer Institute on "Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom." He will lead sessions on "The Demonstrative Model of Knowledge in Aristotle," and "Wisdom and Demonstrative Knowledge in Aristotle."

Glenn Hartz read a paper (co-authored with J.A. Cover), "Are Leibnizian Monads Spatial?" at the April Meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

Peter King presented "*Obligationes*: Opposing and responding, the function of *positio*" at the April Meetings of the American Philosophical Association. In May, at the 24th International Mediaeval Conference, held at Kalamazoo, he read his paper, "Duns Scotus on the priority of intention."

Andy Oldenquist published "Remarks on Affirmative Action," in *Affirmative Action and the University*, edited by Steven Cahn and

just published by Temple University Press.

Bernard Rosen's *Ethical Theory: Strategies and Concepts* was published by Mayfield Publishing Company in December, 1992. The book began as a second edition of *Strategies of Ethics*, but turned into a significantly different work. A new chapter on psychologically based theories—eg., Kohlberg and Gilligan—replaces a chapter on egoism. Normative ethical theories that do not use principles as basic units are covered in a chapter that includes existentialism, intuitionism, and pragmatism. *Ethical Theory* also contains new material on the theory of value and on current controversies involving moral realism. The book was designed for ethical theory courses, in contrast with Bernie's *Ethics Companion*, which was intended for applied ethics courses.

During Winter Quarter, 1992, Bernie, along with Mohan Wali of Natural Resources, developed and offered a program called "Ethics, Ecology, and the Human Condition." The program was funded by Battelle Endowment for Technology and Human Affairs, and offered a series of talks by eminent philosophers, ecologists, engineers, business people, and scientists.

Stewart Shapiro's "Modality and Ontology" is forthcoming in *Mind* and his "Antirealism and Modality" is forthcoming in the *Proceedings of the 15th International Wittgenstein Symposium*. Another article, "Foundationalism and the Foundations of Mathematics"

appeared in *Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics*, a 1992 book edited by Michael Detlefsen.

Allan Silverman was a visiting Associate Professor at the University of Pittsburgh in the Fall of 1992, and will be a Visiting Professor at Yale next year.

William Taschek's paper "Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information Content" appeared in the October issue of *Mind*. "Belief, Substitution, and Logical Form" will soon appear in *Nous*. William also is co-author of the Harper-Collins textbook, *History of Philosophy*, in which he was responsible for chapters on Immanuel Kant, The Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell.

In January, **Neil Tennant** delivered "The Decoding Problem: Do We Need to Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence to Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence?" in Los Angeles at the SPIE Colloquium on the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence in the Optical Spectrum.

Words from the Alumni

Alexandra Coe (B.A. 1977 and M.A. (Classics) 1980) writes that after undergoing "a conversion from Platonism to Christianity, I received a Master of Divinity degree from Union Theological Seminary in 1985, and then went on to pursue doctoral work in the

Union/Columbia joint program in Religion." Alexandra is currently writing a dissertation with the tentative title: "A Realized Eschatology of the Spirit: Patristic Exegesis of the Lord's Prayer." She reports that her favorite theologian is the Platonist Christian, Origen. She married Mark Bennett, a woodworker, in 1988, and was ordained in July 1991 (United Church of Christ). That same year she was called to the Mount Vernon (NY) Community Church of the Circle. She has a one-year old son, Luke Bennett, and the family is completed with a pair of German Shepherds, Chuck and Moxie.

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Kenneth Rose (B.A. 1982) received his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University in the study of Religion in November 1992. He previously received his Masters and his Master of Divinity degrees from Harvard in 1984 and 1986. Hilary Putnam was one of the readers for his dissertation, which focused on John Hick's philosophy of religious pluralism. Ken is now an assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies (tenure track) at Christopher Newport University in Newport News, Virginia. In addition to teaching introduction to global philosophy and basic religion, he is also developing upper-level courses in comparative religion.

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Barbara Scholz (Ph.D. 1990) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toledo and Book Review Editor of *Teaching Philosophy*. Last summer (1992), she was an NEH Fellow at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. In January, she presented "Language, Mind and Abstract Objects" with her collaborator, Geoffery K. Pullum, at the Linguistics Society of America Conference and presented "Defining 'Artwork': Implicit Definitions and Folk Aesthetics" at the Central American Philosophical Association meeting in April. In the summer of 1993, she will teach philosophy of linguistics at the Linguistics Society of America Summer Institute to be held at The Ohio State University. Her current research interests focus on structuralism in the philosophy of linguistics, mathematics, and language.

Colloquia

October 15

Kit Fine, *The University of California at Los Angeles*

"On the Concept of Essence"

November 20

Donald Morrison, *Rice University*
The Place of Unity in Aristotle's Metaphysical Project"

January 22

Tamara Horowitz, *University of Pittsburgh*

"The Rationality Argument"

February 4


Gareth Matthews, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

"First Personal Arguments for Dualism in Augustine and Descartes"

February 5

Terence Parsons, *University of California, Irvine*

"Theory of Meaning for Natural Languages"



Terence Parsons

"Carnap from Logical Syntax to Semantics"

“Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation”

"A Social Route from Reasoning to Representation"

“Interpreting the Claim that Meaning is Normative”

Stephen Engstrom, *The University of Pittsburgh*
"The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism"

Matthew Foreman, *The Ohio State University and the University of California at Irvine*
"The Current State of the Foundations of Mathematics"

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This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal blue ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.



Left to right: Dan Farrell, Jim Okapal, Don Hubin

The Bingham Prize

The Winner of this year's Bingham Award is **Jim Okapal**. Jim presented a version of his winning paper, "Morals by Accident," at a ceremony on May 28, attended by faculty, students, and Jim's wife and proud parents. The prize this year was the Bingham Medal plus \$250. The ceremony was conducted by **George Schumm**, who explained the origin and history of the medal. Jim is spending the summer working at the Columbus Zoo.



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