Conference on Emotion and Value

On the weekend of October 22-24, the department hosted a conference on Emotion and Value. Michael Smith, of the Australian National University, gave the first talk: "In Search of the Philosopher’s Stone: the Resentment Argument." He criticized and then attempted to reconstruct Thomas Nagel’s famous argument that, since you would resent it if someone were unjustly hurting you, you have a reason not to unjustly hurt another. The argument appears to be a derivation of an ought from an (hypothetical) is, and Smith argued that his reconstructed version of the argument could indeed achieve that apparently alchemical result. The lecture was followed by a lively discussion and then a dinner for conference participants and invited guests at Alana’s restaurant.

On Saturday, there were three talks. Simon Blackburn, of the University of North Carolina, spoke about "Alleged Conflicts of Reason and Passion." He defended his Humean conception of ethical thought and practice against various recent objections, arguing that noncognitive attitudes can be assessed by standards of correctness, but that these standards are themselves expressions of further such attitudes. Our department’s own Justin D’Arms gave a talk entitled "Response-Dependent Concepts and Basic Emotions." In it he defended a sentimentalist account of certain evaluative concepts. But he argued that sentimentalists have been too permissive in their conception of the sentiments available to their purposes. Properly speaking, the only evaluative concepts that are sentiment-dependent are those (such as funny, fearsome and shameful) that invoke basic human emotions. Allan Gibbard of the University of Michigan gave the final lecture of the day, "Perceiving Virtue and Vice." He explored the idea of a “moral sense,” arguing for a fundamental disanalogy between values and secondary qualities. He also argued that moral judgments (say, of wrongness) commit the judge to the existence of a natural property which all and only wrong acts have. Much of the subsequent discussion focused on the plausibility of this commitment and its compatibility with Gibbard’s well-known noncognitivist theory of ethics.

A lively party at the home of Allan and Ann Silverman on Saturday night

Words from the Chair

Hi, everyone! I hope your summer was a productive and enjoyable one and that you’re ready for an exciting year. First and foremost, warm and very hearty greetings to our two new colleagues, Sylvia Berryman and Lisa Shabel; our ten new graduate students; and our visiting assistant professor, Tony Roark. Details about all of these new colleagues and students can be found elsewhere in this issue.

Here I just want to say how delighted I am that you have chosen to join us and how certain I am you’ll not regret your decision.

Last year was a very exciting one, especially on the recruitment front, and this year promises to be no less so. We have been authorized to continue our search for a replacement for Alan Code, our former O’Donnell Professor, and to begin searches for another senior and another junior colleague. Our junior position will be aimed at finding someone in ethics; our two senior positions will be “open.”

Don Hubin will chair the junior search committee and will be helped by Justin D’Arms, Peter King, and Tommie Shelby. Sylvia Berryman and Lisa Shabel will join Don and the other committee members for the interviews in Boston.

Diana Raffman will be leading the senior search, with the help of

(continued on page 2)
Words from the Chair (continued from page 1)

Allan Silverman and myself. With the department’s support, we three have already begun identifying distinguished senior philosophers in whom the department might have an interest and are bringing some of these people to campus for invited papers.

The department executive committee will take the lead on the O’Donnell search, charged with doing everything possible to get names of suitable people before the entire department as soon as possible. This means that Lee Brown, George Pappas, Diana Raffman, William Taschek, and I, who constitute that committee, will be anxious to have your suggestions for this extremely important position.

Searches such as these take a lot of time and energy, but I think I can safely say that everyone is more than ready to do this work and extremely excited about the opportunities we have before us!

Though we will be searching, as indicated, for at least one more junior colleague, I think it’s safe to say that everyone in the department is now committed to doing everything possible to recruit two really exciting new senior colleagues. We have suffered serious losses at the senior level over the past three years, and we are anxious to replace at least some of these former colleagues with equally distinguished senior philosophers. With the extraordinarily talented colleagues we now have at the junior and “middle” ranks, along with those distinguished senior colleagues we have retained, two really good appointments at the senior level will ensure that we will remain one of the fifteen or so most highly regarded departments in the country.

This will be a busy year for many other reasons as well: we have an extraordinary number of exciting visitors coming in this year, including a list of Friday colloquium speakers discussed elsewhere in this issue and a group of conference speakers that would be hard to match. Invited for a conference on ethics and the emotions, these latter include, in addition to our own Justin D’Arms, Simon Blackburn of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Myles Burnyeat of Oxford University; Allan Gibbard of the University of Michigan; and Michael Smith of the Australian National University. Later this quarter, we will be announcing a similarly illustrious group of historians, invited for a spring conference on recent work in early modern philosophy.

As if all this is not enough, I’m extremely pleased to be able to announce that our Undergraduate Philosophy Club is now more active than ever! Under the leadership of Colleen Stenger and Ben Beebe, the club now meets weekly and attracts a huge crowd of students for discussions that often last late into the night. Sincere thanks to Colleen and Ben for their hard work in bringing the club back to such an intense level of activity.

Add to this a series of exciting seminars for our graduate students and a host of new and old courses for our majors and other undergraduates, and you can see how really busy we will be!

I can never resist the temptation, in these annual beginning-of-the-year words, to look quickly over the past year, after anticipating the next. And what a year it’s been! This past year’s class of incoming graduate students did not disappoint us: they are just as bright and involved as we hoped, and we look forward to seeing more of them this year, as we welcome the new and very large first-year class that Robert Kraut and the rest of our graduate recruitment committee have brought us. If you see someone who looks as though they’re here to stay for a while, but you don’t know their name, I hope you’ll introduce yourself and find out who they are!

Both faculty and students (undergraduates as well as graduate students) were extremely active once again this past year, presenting invited papers at conferences and other scholarly meetings all over the world, including an especially large contingent of department faculty and students who presented papers at an international conference on contemporary epistemology in Slovenia. These trips are described in more detail elsewhere in this issue, as are various other student and faculty achievements, including the recognition of our colleague Neil Tennant for his work with our student Justin Ison, who is visually impaired. Here I just want to say once again how proud I am to be associated with a department where students as well as faculty are regularly invited to present their work at prestigious venues both in this country and abroad, and who are at the same time regularly honored for their teaching, research, and service contributions.

Other highlights of the past year, and exciting events upcoming this year, are described elsewhere in this issue. One last bit of good news I can give you, just in as we go to press, is that Professor Emeritus Robert Turnbull, who is still enjoying the glow of all those positive reviews for his recently published book on Plato’s Parmenides, is recovering well from surgery for a broken hip. Bob and his wife Marge recently celebrated their sixtieth wedding anniversary with a hundred and fifty old friends and colleagues, an occasion that gave many of us an opportunity to see a dozen or so of our former graduate students!

I think all of you know that this will be my last year as chair. It’s been
Words about the Faculty

Robert Batterman’s “Multiple Realizability and Universal-ity,” will appear in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Since last year, Bob has presented versions of this paper at The University of Illinois, The University of Alberta, and The University of Pittsburgh. Another paper, ‘A ‘Modern’ (= Victorian!) Attitude Towards Scientific Understanding,” will be published in The Monist. Bob has been invited to give a paper for a Foundations of Physics workshop at The University of California, Irvine, this coming February.


Visit our Web Site

Learn more about the philosophy department by visiting our web site: http://www.philosophy.ohio-state.edu

Just in case you didn’t know about our new department...
Words about the Faculty (continued from page 3)

“Comments on Procedural Morality and Hart’s Separation Thesis,” at the Ohio Philosophical Association in April. Peter King presented “John Peter Olivi on Mental Architecture” at the Kalamazoo Mediaeval Conference, May 1998. In October he presented “Jean Buridan on Universals: The Final Word” at a conference on the Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, at Emory University. In November he

traveled to the University of Uppsala, where he presented “The Collapse of the Scholastic Account of the Passions” at a conference on Emotion and Cognition in Late Mediaeval and Early Modern Philosophy, and in December 1998, he presented “Why Descartes Invented the Mind” at a conference on Descartes at UCLA. His “Aquinas on Metaphysics as the Science of Unity” was given at the Second Annual E. A.

Moody Mediaeval Philosophy Workshop at UCLA in February 1999, and, in April he presented “Augustine as Skeptic: Menn’s Mistake” at a UCLA Conference on Descartes. In May he presented “Abelard on the Status Redivivus (Comments on Guilford)” at the Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

George Pappas’s book Berkeley’s Thought, has been accepted by Cornell University Press and at the present time it is “at press.” His article “Berkeley’s Philosophy” is also at press and scheduled to appear in The Blackwell Guide to Modern Philosophy. He has also prepared an invited paper, “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology,” for the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The articles in this work are posted online, and readers can write in comments and criticisms. Authors are expected to update their articles from time to time given new developments in the field and given any good items in reader comments. George presented a paper, “Abstraction and Existence in Berkeley,” twice: once at the Southeastern Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, in November 1998 at Virginia Tech, and then again at a conference on Berkeley held in April 1999 in Newport, Rhode Island. He commented on a paper by Todd Ryan at the Eastern Division APA meetings in December 1998. In June of this year he presented “Epistemic Deference” at a conference in epistemology in Bled, Slovenia. In July he presented a paper at a conference on Berkeley at University College, Dublin; the paper is entitled “Berkeley and Perceptual Realism.” In September he presented a paper at a conference in Romania. His paper “Berkeleyan Idealism and Impossible Performances,” was reprinted in The Empiricists, edited by Margaret Atherton.

The Fink Prize

The winner of the department’s 1999 Fink Prize was David Eng. The ceremony was deferred until autumn quarter because David was away reading his prize-winning paper at a conference in Slovenia. Here is his summary of the paper:

According to the reliabilist, the justificatory status of a belief depends on the reliability of the process that produces it. A serious and seemingly intractable problem that has been posed for this view is the Generality problem. It seems that every belief is produced by a number of processes, each possessing a different degree of reliability. Depending on which process is chosen, the theory will produce a different result. The challenge for the reliabilist is to identify in a non ad hoc way the process that produces the correct epistemic results when applied within the reliabilist account.

I provide a solution to this problem that adopts a non ad hoc way of identifying a process that has been suggested by William Alston. According to Alston, the reliabilist can identify in a non ad hoc way a unique process by identifying the psychologically real one, the process that reflects the actual dynamics of belief formation. As a solution to the Generality problem, Alston’s proposal has been criticized on several grounds. First, Feldman has suggested that identifying the psychologically real process fails to identify a unique process in that there are a number of processes that are psychologically real. Second, it has been argued by Feldman and even Alston that even if we grant that there is a unique psychologically real process, this process will produce results that do not accord with our epistemic intuitions. Contra these criticisms, I argue that there must be a unique psychologically real process, and this process produces results that accord with our epistemic intuitions. The criticisms raised by Feldman and Alston rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Generality problem.

Special recognition was given to Roy Cook, Jon Curtis, and Deborah Tollefson for their submissions.
Allan Silverman has reviewed Everson’s Aristotle on Perception for Ancient Philosophy and McCabe’s Plato’s Individuals for The Philosophical Review. In April he gave a talk, “The Unity of Logos,” at the Northern Association Ancient Philosophy Meetings in Durham, England.

Stewart Shapiro is in Scotland where he has been appointed Professorial Fellow at the University of St. Andrews. He has finished his book Thinking about Mathematics, which is forthcoming from Oxford University Press. He has been invited to a conference on Truth in Leuven, Belgium, this November.


Sylvia Berryman

Sylvia Berryman is interested in ancient Greek philosophy, especially problems in natural philosophy and metaphysics. She studied at the University of British Columbia and the University of Oregon before entering the Joint Programme in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin. Her dissertation reconsidered the ideas of Strato of Lampsacus, one of Aristotle’s early and most interesting successors. For the past three years she has been working at King’s College, London, as a post-doctoral fellow on the ancient Commentators on the Aristotle Project. Her research interests include problems of change and explanation as well as philosophical responses to problems in natural philosophy.

Marriage Bells and Babies

Graduate students David Eng and Sondra Bacharach, who met after entering our program, were married this past July. They invited Professors George Pappas and Marshall Swain to conduct the ceremony, which occurred in the Botanical Gardens on the University of California, Berkeley, campus. The Alameda County Commissioner of Marriages cooperated in this venture by duly appointing George Pappas and Marshall Swain as Deputy Marriage Commissioners just for the purpose of marrying David and Sondra. The ceremony went without a hitch amidst the stunning redwoods of Berkeley on a spectacularly beautiful day in July. The newlyweds spent their honeymoon in the area and are now back at Ohio State working hard on their degrees. George and Marshall have returned to their normal duties. Also on the marriage front, Dan Farrell assumed his alternative identity as a minister and performed the wedding for Christina Pappas and Steve McMillion. The ceremony was held in Chicago on a large ship out on Lake Michigan on August 14. Dan has also returned to his more familiar identity and his normal duties. Finally, there are two future marriages in the offering—Mark Silcox and Heidi Olsen are engaged, as are Jon Cogburn and Emily Beck.

Newest Arrivals to the Department:

Regan and Beth Reitsma Diederick Immanuel Reitsma December 22, 1998
Neil and Janel Tennant Henry Westfall Tennant April 15, 1999
Justin and Jodi D’Arms Cecelia Rachel D’Arms April 25, 1999
Eric and Deborah Tollefson Finn Christian Tollefson August 2, 1999
Adam and Kimberly Moore Alan Christopher Moore August 19, 1999

George Pappas wins Exemplary Faculty Award

George Pappas was the winner of the College of Humanities 1998 Exemplary Faculty Award. This award recognizes a faculty member’s having developed a noteworthy profile with exceptional strength in research and teaching, and having served as a role model for students and younger colleagues. Awarded receive a $2000 stipend and one quarter of release time for professional development.
Words from the Graduate Students

Several graduate students have published in high-quality journals over the last year. Jon Cogburn and Roy Cook have collaborated on a paper “What Negation is Not: Intuitionism and 0=1” that is forthcoming in Analysis. Deborah Tollefson’s “Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind-Body Interaction” was published in Hypatia this summer. Sarah Pessin’s paper “Hedonism: Boethius Meets the Neoplatonists” was published in the Journal of the History of Philosophy in January 1999. Sondra Bacharach gave a paper entitled “Why Did Art End?” at the American Society for Aesthetics’s Pacific Division meetings this spring. She commented on John Bender’s work at the spring 1999 Ohio Philosophical Association meeting in a paper called “Bender on Aesthetic Realism.” Ryan Nichols has a paper entitled “Actions, Their Effects and Preventable Evil” forthcoming in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. He presented his paper “Turning the Tables: Leibniz’s Triumph Over Strawson” at Rutgers University’s annual graduate student philosophy meetings this spring.

Colloquia 1998-99

October 23rd
Geoffrey Hellman, University of Minnesota
“Three Varieties of Mathematical Structuralism”

October 30th
Timothy Williamson, Edinburgh University
“Scepticism, Contextualism and Evidence”

November 6th
Julius Moravcsik, Stanford University
“Did Plato or Anyone Refute Parmenides?”

November 13th
Susan Sauve Meyer, University of Pennsylvania
“Chains of Causes: Stoic Theory of Fate”

November 30th
Crispin Wright, University of St. Andrews
“Intuitionism and Indeterminacy (I) —The Best Revisionary Argument and a Problem with it; Putnam’s Approach to the Sorties”

December 4th
Crispin Wright, University of St. Andrews
“Intuitionism and Indeterminacy (II) — Minimal Truth-aptitude and Cognitive Command; the Proper Characterisation of Vagueness”

February 5th
Kenneth Gemes, Yale University
“Logical Content, Empirical Significance, and Confirmation”

February 19th
Patricia Curd, Purdue University
“The Metaphysics of Physics: Mixture and Separation in Empedocles and Anaxagoras”

March 12th
Louise M. Antony, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
“Multiple Realizability, Projectibility, and the Reality of Mental Kinds”

April 2nd
Eckart Förster, University of Munich
“Transformations in Kant’s Doctrine of God”

April 12th
Crispin Wright, University of St. Andrews
“Response-dependency and Physicalism (I)”

April 16th
Crispin Wright, University of St. Andrews
“Response-dependency and Physicalism (II)”

May 25th
John Cooper, Princeton University
“Justice: Socrates vs. Glaucce”

May 28th
John Cooper, Princeton University
“Method and Science in On Ancient Medicine”
conference in March 1999. "Reid on Perceptual Knowledge and Perceptual Error," part of Ryan's dissertation, will be read at the APA Eastern Division meetings in December 1999.

Mark Silcox read his "Expressivism and the Frege/Geach Problem" at the 1999 Canadian Philosophical Association's annual conference.

David Eng presented a paper called "Psychological Realism: A Solution to the Generality Problem" at an epistemology conference in Bled, Slovenia, in May.

Gainfully Employed

Joe Salerno and Jon Cogburn have one-year appointments at William Patterson University and at Louisiana State University, respectively.

James Summerford has taken a tenure-track position at Ohio University's Lancaster campus, while Ai Lent is teaching at Wittenberg University for the summer and fall terms.

Pierluigi Miraglia was at Kent State University for one year. His paper "Finite Mathematics and the Justification of the Axiom of Choice" will appear in Philosophia Mathematica in January 2000. He will join Jon Curtis as an ontological engineer at Cycorp, working on artificial intelligence applications.

New Students

Standing, left to right: William Korner, Debra Dority, Pedro Casiano, Julian Cole (in front), Greg Hayman, Bill Roche, and Yimin Kui. Sitting, left to right: Henry Pratt, Mike Jaworski, and Joshua Huber.

We have a list of ten students who entered our Ph.D. program autumn quarter.

They are:

Pedro Javier Casiano, University of Puerto Rico: medieval philosophy, metaphysics, philosophical logic.
Julian Cole, University of St. Andrews, Ph.D. in mathematics: philosophy of science, logic and philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind.
Debra Dority, University of Central Arkansas: social and political philosophy, moral theory.
Gregory Hayman, University of Victoria, Canada: moral epistemology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of language.
Joshua Huber, University of California, Santa Barbara: philosophy of language, logic.
Mike Jaworski, Bowling Green: ethics, epistemology.
William Korner, Ohio University: philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of economics, political theory, philosophy of language.
Yimin Kui, Louisiana State University: ABD in mathematics, Purdue University: philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, logic and philosophy of mathematics.
Henry Pratt, University of Wisconsin-Madison: aesthetics, metaphysics.
William Roche, University of Utah: moral theory, epistemology.

Summer Film Festival

For the second year, the philosophy graduate students held a summer film festival. This year they met once a week in the Gluck Library to see movies culled from the suggestion sheets that were circulated during the spring term. A broad variety of cinematic styles was showcased, ranging from early silent films to recent Hollywood products, and from 50s monster movies to avant-garde religious-themed films. When the films warranted it, discussion of the issues raised followed the viewings. Popcorn and sweet snacks were provided. Although attendance was fairly sparse this year, organizer Rick Groshong hopes to be able to hold a third installment of the "workshop" next summer.
Words from the Undergraduates

The Undergraduate Philosophy Club has enjoyed a revitalization in the past year! Last winter quarter, the club began to meet weekly and had a solid attendance record of about twelve people per meeting. The discussion-based group confronted many topics, including the philosophy of time, education, paternalism, and animal rights. Some of last year’s highlights were a discussion led by Professor Hubin on liberty and equality and a camping trip at the end of the school year.

Thanks to the efforts of president Colleen Stenger, vice presidents Connie Gadell-Newton and Meg Triplett, treasurer Matthew Brinegar, and a few committed members, the club has taken steps to become an “official” organization at Ohio State. The first function of the club as an official student activity is participation in the Student Involvement Fair. The club hopes to attract new members with different ideas and backgrounds by having a table at the fair.

Weekly meetings are being planned for the coming year and another camping trip will be organized. Positive feedback has been given by many members of the club, which is comprised of both philosophy majors and non-majors. Colleen hopes to hold more discussions with professors and still preserve a comfortable and informal atmosphere in which students may exchange ideas.

The 1996-99 Bingham Prize, which brings $500 and the Bingham Medal to the winner, was awarded to Mary Flaherty Madia, for her paper “Objections to the Nature of Raitlon’s Evaluative Facts.”

Conference on Religion and Science

This past May, the Department of Philosophy, along with the Division of Comparative Studies, hosted a conference entitled “Religion and Science: Tension, Engagement and Accommodation.” Organized by Tamar Rudavsky, the conference brought together scholars from around the world to talk about issues pertaining to the history of science, philosophy, and religion. Professor Ennan McMullin (Notre Dame University) gave the plenary address in which he situated the often uneasy relation between religion and science into a historical context; he focused on the trial of Galileo as a paradigm. Other invited speakers included Professors Kenneth Seeskin, Owen Gingerich, Gerald Schroeder, John Hedley Brooke, Bernard Lightman, Denis Lamoureux, and Margaret Wertheim. Sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, the conference provided participants an opportunity to explore critical points of contact between science and religion. Over forty papers were read, and close to two-hundred people attended the many sessions held during the three days. Several former Ohio State philosophy alumni were in attendance as well, including Brendan Minogue and Jeff Koperski. One highlight of the conference was the Monday evening session held at Perkins Observatory, north of the university; director Tom Burns presented an engaging talk and members of the Columbus Astronomy Society were out in full force with their telescopes. Future programs with the John Templeton Foundation are now in the planning stages. According to Tamar, “This conference was a perfect setting for our faculty and students to discover that there can be genuine dialogue between religion and the sciences.” She adds that “we hope to build upon this experience and continue the exchange between the two communities here at Ohio State.”
Eckart Förster’s Visit

During March and April of 1999, Eckart Förster from the University of Munich, Germany, joined our department as the Max Kade Visiting Professor of Philosophy and German. Förster taught an intensive seminar on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason for our graduate and upper-level undergraduate students. In addition, he gave a public lecture on “Transformations in Kant’s Doctrine of God” in which he argued that late in his career Kant abandoned as philosophically untenable the doctrine of God as a postulate of practical reason—a doctrine that to many Kant scholars marks one of the core elements of Kant’s moral philosophy. In early April, Förster participated in the University Honors Center Fireside Chat Program and spoke to undergraduates in one of the residence halls about the nature of philosophy in general and about his own research interests in particular. Charles Kielkopf, who has struggled with Kant for many years, attended Eckart’s seminar and had the following to say: “Over the years I have appreciated the opportunities to audit lectures, by visitors and my colleagues, on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. They have always been rewarding, but my attendance at Eckart Förster’s lectures and discussions has been especially so. A notable feature of Förster’s approach was to use the first edition of 1781, the A-edition, as the primary text rather than the second edition of 1787, the B-edition. His rationale was that the first edition should give us a better idea of Kant’s original goals for conducting a critique of pure reason. Such an approach may seem to restrict the course to studying Kant at an undeveloped stage of his thought. However, under the guidance of Förster, who is an expert on Kant’s Nachlass, the approach had the opposite effect of leading us to study Kant as a philosopher who struggled with issues of the first edition, into the second edition as well as into later published and unpublished writings. Studying Kant as a philosopher who continued to struggle with his basic philosophical problems throughout his life leads us to appreciate his well-known dictum at A838, B866 that we cannot learn a philosophy but only how to philosophize.”

Anthony Roark

Tony Roark joined the department this year as a visiting assistant professor. He came to us from Seattle, where he had been doing graduate work in philosophy at the University of Washington since 1993. Tony received a B.A. in philosophy and English from the University of Idaho, and he says that the turn of seasons here in Ohio is a pleasant reminder of his home state. He returned to Seattle in early December and successfully defended his dissertation, an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time in Physics IV. Tony has numerous philosophical interests outside the history of philosophy, including metaphysics and philosophy of law. When not doing philosophy, Tony enjoys cooking, the guitar, and many outdoor activities.
Visits by Crispin Wright

by Joseph Salerno and Stewart Shapiro

The department is pleased to have had Professor Crispin Wright as our Distinguished Scholar in Residence. Professor Wright is Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews University in Scotland. He visited the department for a full week each in both the autumn and spring quarters. On each occasion he delivered a pair of formal lectures, gave a special presentation to a graduate seminar, and was the focus of a special symposium in which he responded to a series of graduate presentations related to his work.

In his first set of lectures, entitled "Intuitionism and Indeterminacy," Professor Wright offered a unified treatment of three technical problems, two of which were posed in other places by our own Ohio State philosophers. These first two problems question the success of some core ideas in Professor Wright's very important and influential book *Truth and Objectivity.* In that book he aims to sort out much of the confusion surrounding the debates between realists and anti-realists. For instance, he distinguishes semantic anti-realism—the thesis that truth in the given area is constrained by possible knowledge—from anti-representationalism—the thesis that purported truths in the area do not serve to represent genuine states of affairs. He goes on to develop a clearer sense of what it would be to decide these matters. He contributes to this end by developing Michael Dummett's suggestion that classical logic carries with it a commitment to semantic realism, and he develops a test for anti-representationalism in terms of what he calls "a failure of Cognitive Command," essentially a failure of sufficiently informed opinions to converge on a single verdict, allowing for the possibility of disagreement that is cognitively blameless.

The first problem, posed by Joseph Salerno at his APA discussion, is that of formulating the semantic anti-realist's assumptions consistently (from the intuitionistic perspective). For given the formulations and limited expressive resources provided in *Truth and Objectivity,* it is not clear that these assumptions are consistent, and so, not clear that the anti-realist can successfully issue his demand to revise classical logic. The second problem, posed by Stewart Shapiro and William Taschek in their *Journal of Philosophy* critical study, is that of carving the representational/non-representational distinction with the notion of Cognitive Command in a way that does not trivialize the distinction. According to Shapiro and Taschek, once we embrace the initial assumptions that Wright requires to get this realism debate off the ground, it will be impossible for Cognitive Command to fail. The third problem that Wright treats is the Sortes Paradox, which results from our very intuitive commitments about vagueness.

In each case Professor Wright motivated substitutions of the initial problematic assumptions with classically equivalent assumptions and independently motivated intuitionistic restrictions that blocked the three unwelcome results.

In his second set of lectures titled "Response Dependence and Physicalism," Professor Wright developed his "response-dependency thesis," an account of what it would be for a given range of judgments to be "extension-determining" rather than "extension-reflecting." Lecture 1 was a defense of Saul Kripke's famous "conceivability argument" for mind-body dualism. Lecture 2 brought this result to the surprising conclusion that response-dependent properties are inconsistent with physicalism.

During each visit, Professor Wright made a special presentation to a graduate seminar, and led a discussion. In the autumn, he delivered "Truth: the Traditional Debate Reviewed," an interesting talk on the Correspondence/Coherence/Pragmatist debate concerning the nature of truth. In the spring he visited Diana Raffman and
Lisa Shabel

Lisa Shabel is a philosopher with interests in Kant, the history of modern philosophy, and the philosophy of mathematics. She received a B.A. in mathematics at Dartmouth College in 1987. After a short career as a mathematics teacher, she went to the University of Pennsylvania to study philosophy, graduating with a Ph.D. in 1998. At Penn, Lisa completed a dissertation entitled "Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Reflections on Mathematical Practice," which was an attempt to offer a new reading of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics based on a study of the 18th century mathematical practice with which he was engaged. She taught 17th and 18th century philosophy for one year at Rutgers University before coming to Ohio State. Lisa will continue to teach and conduct research on Kant and his predecessors and hopes to pursue wider interests in the history of philosophy and philosophy of mathematics.

Disability Award

Neil Tennant was selected last spring by the Office of Disability Services for a distinguished service teaching award for his work with Justin Isom. Neil recorded all the assignments in the Philosophy Proseminar and worked with Justin to devise a series of vocal conventions to facilitate the auditory comprehension of logical formulas. Justin noted that often Neil would insert reminders of premises and passages where a sighted reader would be inclined to leaf back to review them. Neil and Justin also worked together to devise a way to represent logical problems in a tactile format.

The department was also selected for an award for our work with the Office of Disability Services in support of Justin.
Friends of Philosophy

Become a Friend of The Ohio State University Department of Philosophy by sending a check payable to The Ohio State University Development Fund.

Send to: Friends of Philosophy • The Ohio State University • Department of Philosophy 350 University Hall • 230 North Oval Mall • Columbus, OH 43210-1365

What's new with you? Whether or not you decide to become a member of the Friends of Philosophy, please inform us of your current whereabouts, your work, career changes, promotions, publications, etc. In future issues we will continue to devote a section to news about alumni.

Conference

(continued from page 1)

featured delicious food and convivial conversation. Our ranks were bolstered by philosophers who had come from other universities, including Pittsburgh, Northwestern, and Franklin and Marshall, in addition to many of the institutions in Ohio. The conference convened again Sunday morning for Myles Burnyeat, of All Souls College, Oxford, to lecture on “Happiness and Tranquility.” Burnyeat argued that the seeds of a contemporary, psychological conception of happiness were sown by Epicurus. The Epicurean account of happiness as tranquility renders it as something mental, as opposed to something determined, as it was for Aristotle, partly by matters outside the mind.