Philosophy/MAP/CEHV talk by Avery Archer

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Avery Archer
January 31, 2020
3:30PM - 5:30PM
Location
353 University Hall

Date Range
Add to Calendar 2020-01-31 15:30:00 2020-01-31 17:30:00 Philosophy/MAP/CEHV talk by Avery Archer

Prof. Avery Archer from the Department of Philosophy at George Washington University will be giving a talk sponsored by the Philosophy Department, MAP and CEHV. 

Title: Inquiry as Epistemic Improvement

Abstract: I defend the thesis that one is inquiring into some matter just in case one engages in information gathering or analysis with the aim of improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to that matter.  Call this the epistemic-improvement view.  The epistemic-improvement view is at odds with the widely discussed view of Jane Friedman, who conceives of inquiry as aimed at arriving at a settled position on some matter. Call this the settledness view.  My colloquium talk will consider two competing versions of the settledness view and argue that both are revisionary of our ordinary intuitions about inquiry.  I then argue that the epistemic-improvement view does a better job at preserving our ordinary intuitions about when an agent is engaged in genuine inquiry.

 

353 University Hall Department of Philosophy philosophy@osu.edu America/New_York public
Description

Prof. Avery Archer from the Department of Philosophy at George Washington University will be giving a talk sponsored by the Philosophy Department, MAP and CEHV. 

Title: Inquiry as Epistemic Improvement

Abstract: I defend the thesis that one is inquiring into some matter just in case one engages in information gathering or analysis with the aim of improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to that matter.  Call this the epistemic-improvement view.  The epistemic-improvement view is at odds with the widely discussed view of Jane Friedman, who conceives of inquiry as aimed at arriving at a settled position on some matter. Call this the settledness view.  My colloquium talk will consider two competing versions of the settledness view and argue that both are revisionary of our ordinary intuitions about inquiry.  I then argue that the epistemic-improvement view does a better job at preserving our ordinary intuitions about when an agent is engaged in genuine inquiry.